



## The Challenges of Greenpeace Indonesia's Supports on One Map Policy Indonesia

Gita M. Nurhidayah

### Gita M Nurhidayah

Affiliation : Statsit  
City : Jakarta  
Country : Indonesia  
Email :  
[gitaalfian@gmail.com](mailto:gitaalfian@gmail.com)

### History

Submission : 3 September 2022  
Review : 22 October 2022  
Completed  
Accepted : 10 November 2022  
Available : 10 December 2022  
Online

### DOI :

[10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.108-129](https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.108-129)

### Abstract

As a branch of international non-governmental organization (NGO), Greenpeace Indonesia has been supporting the policy of One Map Policy (OMP) Indonesia since 2017. This policy is essential to manage the forestry and land in Indonesia as deforestation is rising. Despite comprehensive support to OMP, Greenpeace Indonesia did not successfully push the Indonesian government to take severe attempts for the OMP legalization. This paper examines the challenges that Greenpeace Indonesia faces in this support. We elaborate on this problem by explaining it through the theory of International NGO Challenges in policy engagement. This theoretical framework is usually used to describe any possible opportunities and challenges for non-state actors to influence government policies. Our research is based on the literature review with the qualitative method. We argue that Greenpeace Indonesia has several challenges that hinder its support of OMP Legalization. Those are both internal coordination and external condition, especially regarding the advocacy system in Indonesia.

**Key Words:** Greenpeace Indonesia, One Map Policy Indonesia, Challenges, Policy Engagement

### Cite this article :

Nurhidayah, G. M. (2022). The Challenges of Greenpeace Indonesia's Supports on One Map Policy Indonesia. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(2), 108–129.  
<https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.108-129>

## INTRODUCTION

Forest fires in Indonesia in 2019 raised questions about the progress of the One Map Policy (OMP), which is claimed to be an alternative solution to the problem of forest and land fires in Indonesia. The scepticism arose because 2019 is the year OMP should have entered the implementation phase. The Minister of Agrarian and Spatial Planning or Head of the State Land Agency, Sofyan Djalil, said that one of the benefits of having OMP is to prevent repeated forest fires in Indonesia. It was conveyed after attending a limited meeting on OMP development at the Presidential Office Jakarta on Tuesday, 13 June 2017. The OMP became a policy agenda sparked during the Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in 2010 and then gained attention again with an acceleration order during the Joko Widodo Presidency in 2016. The president officially signed Presidential Regulation No. 9 of 2016 concerning the Acceleration of the Implementation of One Map Policy at the level of accuracy Map Scale 1:50,000. OMP aims as a policy of the Indonesian government to realize good forest and land governance to avoid conflicts over land tenure in Indonesia in geospatial information. This agenda was motivated by the incident of discrepancies in inland area data regarding vegetation and forest cover maps between the Presidential Working Unit for Development Supervision and Control (UKP-PPP or UKP4) and the Ministry of Forestry and Environment (KLHK) when President SBY requested the data (Silviana, 2019).

The Geospatial Information Agency (Badan Informasi Geospasial/BIG) was formed to regulating the implementation of geospatial information, providing accuracy, up-to-date and legal certainty from the existing data. This agency is nothing but an overhaul of the National Survey and Mapping Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional/BAKOSURTANAL), appointed as the organizer of Basic Geospatial Information, for the foundation of the OMP (Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 4 Tahun 2011 Tentang Informasi Geospasial, 2011). BIG is mandated to form Geospatial Information (IG) through cooperation, coordination, integration, synchronization, and encouraging maximum use (BIG, 2017). In addition, BIG is also responsible for unifying all map data information produced by the relevant sectors into an integrative map form. The aim is to avoid the later problems of overlapping information and formations from previous maps. All these responsibilities are outlined in the draft of OMP. This regulation is expected to be a standard map reference to guide policy direction for all levels of society regarding forest and land management in Indonesia.

Looking at the deforestation issue in Indonesia, several Civil Society Organizations appear to show their concern. This issue has become an exclusive topic of discussion

after the forest and land fires in Indonesia in 2015. Several analyses also reveal that the Indonesian government's national policy in 1980, which opened forest concessions by changing the function of natural forests for plantations, and transmigration and irrigation development and agricultural expansion, contributed to the increase in forest fires. Increased investment to support the economy also causes the intensity of forest and land fires in Indonesia. Development in Indonesia which continues to grow, often does not pay attention to environmental problems. Environmental damage caused by human activities occurs due to a lack of ecological insight so that the use of forests by burning is natural (Putri, 2019).

Greenpeace Indonesia is one of the branches of Greenpeace International whose goal is to save the environment (Virgy et al., 2020). With the OMP draft, it is hoped that there will be no more land licensing problems between the government, business actors, and the community as the perpetrators of forest and land fires in Indonesia. Greenpeace Indonesia has taken a responsive approach to the Indonesian government to realize OMP since the 2015 land and forest fires in Indonesia, hoping that OMP can become a legally binding basis for traditional land and forest governance. Opening petitions nationally and internationally is one of the paths taken by Greenpeace Indonesia. This action was taken to strengthen the moratorium on land clearing, which is then handed over to the Indonesian government to influence the acceleration of policy formation and collect Indonesia's commitment to forest and land protection (Putri, 2019). In addition to providing an overview of the expected CSOs, Greenpeace Indonesia collaborated with Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Global Forest Watch (GFW) to launch an interactive map platform called the "Kepo Hutan" map. This map is an open map with easy access for the community to see detailed information about company concessions and how they relate to peatlands, hotspots, and warnings against deforestation.

However, Greenpeace Indonesia's response and response to the OMP plan to the government was faced with obstacles that led to the weakening of Greenpeace Indonesia's support for the OMP agenda. This event shows that the effectiveness of the OMP for the problem of forest and land fires in Indonesia has not been fully realized. We can see the repeated occurrences of forest and land fire crises in Indonesia in 2019, which is based on the agenda for accelerating the realization of OMP to be the year limit for the completion of OMP and knowing the causes and finding solutions to these problems. Based on the background described, this research focuses on gathering information regarding the obstacles that Greenpeace Indonesia then faces in supporting the Indonesian Government's OMP agenda.

One of the studies on OMP conducted by Shahab (2016) examines the root causes of creating the OMP agenda in Indonesia to analyze the future of OMP. Shahab departs from an analysis of conflicts and overlapping claims on land that often occur in Indonesia. However, Indonesia is a developing country that still needs a national development agenda to achieve prosperity. Forest and land areas are vulnerable to this agenda, so it is necessary to create strict regulation. OMP is an agenda that aims to unify all geospatial data which can then be used as a reference for national maps for all groups. Since the establishment of the OMP in 2010 with good enthusiasm, the OMP's momentum has slowly started to decline. Until it was re-echoed during the presidential campaign of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2014, but still not developed to its full potential.

The research on the implementation of OMP by Silviana (2019) examines the governance of OMP rules for the land sector to prevent normative conflicts in land administration by using a normative legal approach as a research method. The result is that to realize orderly land administration, OMP still needs to be reviewed comprehensively, this is because there are still problems related to ownership disputes and duplication of evidence of land ownership (Silviana, 2019). Overall, Silviana (2019)'s writing focuses on the implementation of OMP which is reviewed from the point of view of national law. How then can the OMP be used as a legal reference to untie the problems of the forest and land crisis in Indonesia, such as forest and land fires which increase every year.

Greenpeace Indonesia is one of the many global environmental care groups that participate in influencing the policies of an actor who contributes to environmental destruction. One of the activities carried out is through the establishment of an advocacy network to seek support at the boundary of the problem to suppress the targeted actors. One of the studies on Greenpeace Indonesia's actions to influence the policy patterns of a target actor is an article entitled "Greenpeace Indonesia's Transnational Advocacy Network Strategy Regarding the Issue of Deforestation in Indonesia by Wilmar International", written by Virgy et al., (2020) (Virgy et al., 2020). Greenpeace Indonesia emphasizes Wilmar International to fulfil its commitments by implementing No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation (NDPE) through the establishment of a transnational advocacy network. Research by Virgy et al., (2020) focuses more on the analysis of the use of the theory of the Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) by Keck & Sikkink, how then these strategies are implemented to suppress targets and try to influence policy making.

## METHOD

The research design which is then used in this study is a qualitative research method. Therefore, in this study, the author tries to present a causal relationship between problems or issues that hinder Greenpeace Indonesia's support for the acceleration of OMP by using a policy engagement approach. This method is used to prepare a report on the barriers faced by Greenpeace Indonesia in encouraging the acceleration of OMP in Indonesia to reduce the forest and land fire crisis in Indonesia. Based on selecting research methods, namely qualitative case studies, the data collection process can be done by interviewing, internet-based research, and archival or document-based research. The process to fulfil all the data needed to analyse the research questions in this study uses primary and secondary data, with primary data in the form of an official report issued by Greenpeace Indonesia. At the same time, secondary data is a source of data by referring to the analysis of primary sources or obtained indirectly, such as internet-based research and archival or document-based research (Bakry, 2017). Data were obtained through printed or online books, articles, related news, and scientific journals, which were then analysed to answer research questions.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Based on the policy engagement approach, as an effort by Greenpeace Indonesia to influence a country's policies, some things are not in favour of Greenpeace Indonesia during the process. Some obstacles come from external and internal to Greenpeace Indonesia. However, referring to the claims of the Policy Engagement article by Court et al., pg. 14. (2006), at the points of internal barriers implicitly explain that the five barriers mentioned can then appear various and according to existing conditions. Court et al. (2006) wrote that CSOs use various approaches to influence policy so that existing barriers are also affected. In the issue of the appointment of OMP by Greenpeace Indonesia in 2015-2019, there are at least three obstacles that then have the most influence during the policy engagement process. We can analyze this issue by referring to the claims written by Court et al., (2006) carried out by Greenpeace Indonesia, namely Poor communication by CSOs; Weak links to other actors; Technical and financial capacity constraints (Court et al., 2006).

## ***External***

### *Problematic Political Context*

As a democratic country, Indonesia should make it easy for all parties to provide input and their point of view on an issue. Then this input can be used as consideration in formulating joint policies. In line with the development of democratization in Indonesia, the era of reform, and international partners' influence, there has been an increase in the number of NGOs. At first, many NGOs were judged not to be in line with the interests of the government. However, it must be acknowledged that many NGOs, including in Indonesia, have played a significant role, especially in the process for community empowerment, so that they can better understand their rights and obligations and encourage participation in the democratic system. As part of an NGO that has an important prestige in Indonesia, Greenpeace Indonesia has taken many actions targeting government policies in overcoming environmental issues. Greenpeace Indonesia's efforts on the issue of OMP to solve the problem of forest and land fires through the unification of all geospatial data and information into one national reference map, in the process encountered obstacles in political issues.

Greenpeace Indonesia, which is eager to issue an independent interactive map platform called the "Kepo Hutan" Map, is expected to trigger the Indonesian government's seriousness in formulating OMP. However, during the period of almost 9, until the Peraturan Presiden (Perpres) expires in December 2019, the OMP has not shown partiality to the hopes and needs of the people, such as the government's claim to protect and recognize people's management areas and to resolve the socio-ecological conflict crisis (WALHI, 2020). In addition, Greenpeace Indonesia's action has drawn protests. A protest was filed by the Palm Oil Agribusiness Strategic Institute (PASPI) to Greenpeace Indonesia. PASPI considered that Greenpeace Indonesia's efforts by issuing digital interactive maps through Kepo Hutan by providing information about forests and plantation concessions seemed to violate the government's authority and violated the law Geospatial areas under the control of the government. PASPI representative, Executive Director, Tungkot Sipayung, said that the Greenpeace Indonesia map, besides not having rights, this action could potentially create conflict between institutions and the community. This digital map is odd because the maps presented on the platform are information and data in the form of unofficial copies from various related sources (Septiadi, 2016).

The acceleration of the OMP to become legally enforceable form, but with the status of the OMP, which is a political policy, cannot be separated from contestation, pressure, and elite interests. This situation urged Greenpeace Indonesia involved in a policy process that tends to be slow and not transparent. Greenpeace Indonesia, together with Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), the Aceh Forest, Nature, and Environment Foundation (HAKA), and Bahasa Indonesia, have urged the government to open access to map data shapefile format that is easy to analyze, unlike JPEG and PDF formats. Indonesia Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL) in November 2016. They demanded transparency of public information, especially forestry data, based on Law 14/2008 on Public Information Disclosure (KIP). They reclaimed the seriousness of President Joko Widodo's Government during the campaign for good governance, clean and trustworthy Government (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016).

After being announced at a hearing at the Central Information Commission targeted at the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan/ KLHK), Greenpeace Indonesia won the lawsuit after being announced at a hearing at the Central Information Commission on Monday, 24 October 2016. However, on 7 November 2016, KLHK officially filed an appeal at the State Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tinggi Tata Usaha Negara/PTUN). The KLHK action should have complied with the decision: through the availability of the KLHK issuing information and data on cover maps such as oil palm concessions, news, and data for Industrial Plantation Forests (HTI), from data on borrowed forest areas for mining, and forest concession rights (HPH.) in a shapefile format that is easy to analyze, open to the public. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry argued that the Law on Geospatial Information requires validating geospatial information before it is announced. The shapefile format has the disadvantage that it cannot contain digital signatures. Getting this information at the KIP assembly is because the information has been validated when it was announced in formats such as JPEG and PDF, which are difficult to analyze (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016).

According to Greenpeace Indonesia, publishing maps in shapefile format that needs to be done by the government is done as a way to anticipate and reduce the number of forest fires in Indonesia (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016). In addition, the map in shapefile format for the public relates to the direct contribution of the community, especially in protecting the forest and helping indigenous peoples, especially those who live in areas that are threatened by the operations of large companies. Through the Fire Prevention Team, Greenpeace Indonesia once faced an issue where they found hotspots in a concession located in the HTI concession in Kec. Tanah Putih, Kab. Rokan Hilir, Riau. However, according to information submitted by the

community and law enforcement officials, they could not confirm who was responsible and the owner of the concession. The existence of a response such as the Ministry of Environment and Forestry by filing an appeal can reflect the weakness of the government's commitment to transparency, thus providing difficult access for outside parties such as the Greenpeace Indonesia government to be involved in formulating and providing input on an issue. In addition, the tendency of non-compliance responses by stakeholders such as the government, which Greenpeace Indonesia targets for data, has made Greenpeace Indonesia move towards a monitoring agenda.

Greenpeace Indonesia considers that the government's action in ratifying the Paris Agreement on Climate Change should not appeal to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. This action is a lousy barrier in the future, especially for information disclosure. KLHK's action by filing an appeal could hinder the momentum of the meeting of countries at the COP22 forum, which took place in Marrakesh, Morocco, in 2016. The lack of transparency made the promises and claims of President Joko Widodo at the COP21 event in Paris the previous year, for the implementation of the OMP as a form of Indonesia's commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 29% by 2030 is difficult (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016). The existence of this problem reflects that the government's efforts are still minimal in formulating a policy such as the OMP, the bureaucracy in Indonesia is often a barrier to solving certain issues, and the involvement of NGOs such as Greenpeace Indonesia to get involved in the policy formulation process (Jong, 2018). Through a report entitled "Karhutla Dalam Lima Tahun," Greenpeace Indonesia asserts that the main obstacle to the realization of halting deforestation and the use of fire for land clearing is Indonesian politics itself, not science or technology (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2020). Emphasizing the significance of transparency is key to ensuring that governments can do their job correctly. The commodity sectors such as palm oil carry out their responsibilities in limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels. Governments need to align the economy to protect biodiversity and climate that goes hand in hand with social justice (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2020).

In addition to transparency barriers, Greenpeace Indonesia is faced with difficulties in indirect supervision of the OMP process. Despite the government's ambition for the realization of OMP, the policy not to open the OMP process to the public makes it difficult for environmental activists, including Greenpeace Indonesia, to monitor and evaluate inputs to the government. And the limited access granted to CSOs shows no government alignment with community interests related to forest and land issues in Indonesia. The data entered the OMP and recognized by the

government only comes from the relevant government agencies and has not included data and information from indigenous peoples. Thus, the government closed the freedom to submit the results of data mapping conducted by the community. It is necessary to involve the outside sector to evaluate and monitor the government's performance during the OMP process. Steps that need to be taken by the government are to strengthen CSOs, open access to the public, and implement court decisions previously submitted by various environmental activists to publish data and information related to forest and land governance in Indonesia.

## ***Internal***

### *Poor Communication*

The obstacle that most CSOs face in approaching a policy in a country is the weak side of communication conveyed to policymakers. Sometimes CSOs are less precise in predicting when the discussion process of policy formulation is taking place, then demand inaccurate input from policymakers (Court et al., 2006). Approaches that are often taken indirectly, such as those provided by policymakers, periodic reports addressed to policymakers, and "insider lobbying" in practice is ineffective in influencing policymakers. This phenomenon indicates that CSOs have less influence than working directly with policymakers (Court et al., 2006). Greenpeace in carrying out actions has characteristics that make them look like nonviolent campaigns and tend to voice a particular issue. If another environmental organization is campaigning for specific problems on a large scale, then Greenpeace will tend not to follow the action because it has been raised on the agenda (Santesson, 2011).

The OMP, a national policy of the Indonesian government, has not received much attention from the international community, including Greenpeace International. Even though Greenpeace Indonesia is part of Greenpeace International, the focus on the vision and mission of each branch makes specific communication to build support for CSOs relatively minimal. So far, there has not been a direct involvement in communication between Greenpeace International and Greenpeace Indonesia on OMP. However, this lack of direct contact did not prevent Greenpeace Indonesia from supporting OMP. Another communication that Greenpeace Indonesia is trying to build is towards Greenpeace Southeast Asia. The problem of forest and land fires in Indonesia, which impacts national borders, has prompted Greenpeace Southeast Asia to collaborate more with Greenpeace Indonesia. They primarily work to protect forests and land in Indonesia, such as the collaboration for the analysis of the moratorium issued by the Indonesian government in the 2011-2012

period. And the existence of a link for the realization of the Kepo Hutan map with Greenpeace Southeast Asia contributed to the visualization and strengthening of data to be included as data and information material on the Kepo Hutan map (Siniwi, 2016).

However, the approach through forest loss by Greenpeace Indonesia has not shown satisfactory results. Greenpeace Indonesia's strategy to raise concerns about the expansion of hotspots in Indonesia's forests and lands through the Kepo Hutan map has indeed received a good response, especially from indigenous peoples and the public concerned.

Furthermore, information about the boundaries of the plantation industry concessions that still existed was reinforced by the government's absence of an official letter or map to explain the situation (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016a). In the end, in 2016, Pak Manan and the local community used the Kepo Hutan map platform to discover the Tohor River's development. This method could help the community reduce doubts and inspire entrepreneurs to manage their forests and lands. And in the end, it all depends on the Government (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016a). These problems can reflect the paramount need for indigenous peoples and the public for information disclosure related to forest and land areas in Indonesia. And the communication built by Greenpeace Indonesia to the community was successful and got a good response.

On the other hand, the communication that has been tried to build OMP policymakers has not been successful. Kepo Hutan has received criticism from PASPI, who claims that Greenpeace Indonesia's actions seem to harass the government and precede its will and trigger inter-agency disputes caused by data collection used in Greenpeace Indonesia's interactive map (Septiadi, 2016). Based on the policy engagement approach, Greenpeace Indonesia needs to take a different approach and communicate directly to policymakers such as CSOs. However, Greenpeace Indonesia still faced difficulties in doing this. Judging from the government's process and developments regarding the OMP, it indicates that there is a delay, and it seems only as a political commitment in the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2011 and is extended every two years by President Joko Widodo. This momentum established the challenge for Greenpeace Indonesia to communicate well with the government. Added to this is whether, after implementing the OMP, the public can easily access the map. Greenpeace Indonesia doubts this. The government's refusal to open access to maps and business permits because it threatens national interests and claims that maps must be confidential to protect industry in Indonesia (Rahmawati, 2019a) add to Greenpeace Indonesia's concerns in moving the OMP agenda to be discussed. The slow process of

formulating the OMP sourced from the Indonesian government makes it difficult for Greenpeace Indonesia to get involved in the issue. As new environmental problems developed, Greenpeace Indonesia's emphasis on OMP is increasingly shifted to more significant environmental issues.

Communication within the Greenpeace Indonesia agency is essential to successful support for Indonesia's OMP agenda. During the OMP discussion process from 2015 to 2019, Greenpeace Indonesia's intense communication was carried out with local environmental communities such as the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI); Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), the Aceh Forest, Nature, and Environment Foundation (HAKA) and the Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL) as well as other organizations such as Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), Rainforest Action Network (RAN) and others that have a common goal namely the realization of OMP. The communication between Greenpeace Indonesia and Greenpeace Southeast Asia then opens opportunities for strengthening to achieve the targets of the OMP plan and demonstrate the existence of regional cooperation carried out by NGOs such as Greenpeace Indonesia. However, during this period, there has not been implicit or explicit direct communication between Greenpeace International and Greenpeace Indonesia, especially on raising OMP in Indonesia.

### ***Weak links to other actors***

Collaboration and network building are essential to support the achievement of the plan by a CSO. Therefore, many CSOs then collaborate with other actors who have similar interests. This opportunity will undoubtedly provide benefits, especially about information sharing and learning. However, it is rare for collaboration to build a network between CSOs to address a particular issue in practice. The act of merging two or more CSOs into one unit is increasingly tricky if differences influence it in funding, encouragement, and motivation, approach, and influence between one another. Even though CSOs, policymakers, and researchers often coexist in handling an issue or problem, it is rare to find cooperation and involvement with one another across the boundaries of existing interests (Court et al., 2006). As a result, when a CSO fails to build a network, it is easy for them to be failed in supporting a particular agenda.

To push the OMP agenda by the Indonesian government, Greenpeace Indonesia encountered obstacles in network development which then did not agree with each other for the acceleration of the OMP. Greenpeace Indonesia does not avoid trying to build partnerships with various actors who have a stake in and contribute to the

land and forest fires issues that lead to accelerating OMP. This partnership is carried out in at least three main sectors: environmental institutions, related companies, and the Indonesian government itself. This partnership can undoubtedly encourage solutions in overcoming forest and land problems through the launch of the Kepo Hutan interactive map platform. Besides, the pressure on the government by filing through legal channels (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2016b) and forming a multi-stakeholder group called the High Carbon Stock Approach Steering Group is running the High Carbon Stock (HCS) program (Putri, 2019). However, Greenpeace Indonesia has not been able to fully network with Indonesian government policymakers directly and obtain firm, sustainable commitments with companies contributing to forest and land management in Indonesia.

Greenpeace Indonesia has won commitments for sustainable forest management from Cargill, New Britain Palm Oil, Daboon, and Wilmar to Asia Pulp and Paper by pledging to actively cooperate in the HCS program Greenpeace Indonesia together with The Forest Trust. And Golden Agri-Resources (GAR) as an alternative solution to deforestation that causes forest and land fires in Indonesia. HCS is a methodology to identify land that has character for plantation development activities or long-term forest protection. This approach was conceived to protect and restore suitable tropical forest areas in landscapes that are undergoing forest conversion to be used as agricultural and plantation areas. It is also used to ensure the availability of land use rights and the livelihoods of indigenous peoples to remain secure.

Greenpeace Indonesia also urges to fulfil Wilmar's promise as one of the palm oil supplier companies alleged to have a major contribution to deforestation and fires in Indonesian forests and lands (Soraya, 2018). This attempt is essential as the background for getting a commitment to implement zero deforestation on Wilmar's products. However, in Wilmar's career as the first company to adopt NDPE, Wilmar itself has not been fully implemented (Greenpeace, 2018a). After the NDPE problem, which was not appropriately implemented, Wilmar again made a pledge that ended in weakness and was not realized. In September 2018, Greenpeace Indonesia activists took direct action without violence in the refinery area owned by Wilmar International, precisely in Bitung, North Sulawesi, by spreading a message containing a call to "Stop Dirty Palm Oil Now ". As a result, Wilmar issued a significant public commitment in 2018 to lead the implementation of cross-industry collaboration to address the deforestation crisis outside of its supply chain. This commitment was continued in December with Aidenenvironment, Mondelez, and Unilever pledged to suspend problematic suppliers and groups from engaging in deforestation actions. They also called for development by production processes,

followed by a mapping platform for implementing these commitments (Rahmawati, 2019b).

Greenpeace Indonesia's approach to collecting the promises of Wilmar and other partner companies was carried out through intensive discussions to find solutions to accelerate commitments to targets in early 2019. However, the hope was achieved, in the end, Greenpeace Indonesia could not get the correct agreement and clear realization. These commitments. Of course, this indicates that the parties involved show that they are not ready and severe to fulfill their obligations in developing supply from deforestation by the end of 2019 (Rahmawati, 2019).

The dispute between Greenpeace Indonesia and Wilmar over the demand for zero-deforestation pledges illustrates those barriers to influencing a policy formulation process from the government and policymakers and from large companies whose primary ties are in driving the Indonesian economy through production and industry that run. Therefore, Greenpeace Indonesia's struggle for the CSOs was then hindered because the interests of these companies blocked their voices. Greenpeace Indonesia then decided to end its engagement with Wilmar-Unilever-Mondelez against the backdrop of the company's weak commitment to stopping deforestation from supply chains (Rahmawati & Achmad, 2019). The absence of a network, primarily through companies and clear and robust policymakers, makes it difficult for Greenpeace Indonesia to encourage the realization of OMP as an alternative to solving forest and land problems in Indonesia. In addition, Greenpeace Indonesia needs to open opportunities for actors outside the country who have an interest in forest and land issues in Indonesia.

Partnership with the government as an essential critical direct involvement with the policy formulation process needs to be carried out by Greenpeace Indonesia to achieve the OMP plan. However, a petition has been collected to strengthen the moratorium on land clearing by 253,800 votes for the complete protection of forests and land in Indonesia (Putri, 2019). This petition is not enough to influence a policy to be implemented optimally. Until the end of the acceleration period in 2019, the OMP still has not given a sign of the government's seriousness in processing data for the OMP.

Based on Greenpeace Indonesia data, law enforcement in Indonesia is still weak, especially for the imposition of sanctions on companies that contribute to the expansion of forest and land fire areas in Indonesia. Reflecting on the cases of violations that have been described, even though severe sanctions are given, such as suspension of permits or civil and criminal lawsuits, does not provide a guarantee for companies to take steps to prevent fires from happening again, especially on

their land. The government also encourages this issue, which often does not consider previous violations in imposing sanctions on companies. The government is not responsive and consistent in its efforts to provide a deterrent effect to these companies (Greenpeace Indonesia, 2020).

Other partnerships pursued by Greenpeace Indonesia apart from industrial companies are also through the banking sector. It is known that banks have a role in supporting the progress of a business through the provision of loans and business capital. In the forest and land fires in Indonesia, in 2017, HSBC, the largest bank in Europe and participating in palm oil funding, issued a publication for commitments to implement zero deforestation (Rahmawati & Zamzami, 2017). Greenpeace investigated and requested a promise to HSBC through their new zero-deforestation policy as a step forward in sustainable financing of the palm oil sector, which accounts for most of the crisis in forest and land fires in Indonesia. The publication of this new policy by HSBC is motivated by pressure and investigations by Greenpeace International linking HSBC to the destruction of rainforests in Indonesia. This campaign is supported by hundreds of thousands of people and includes thirty thousand HSBC customers (Rahmawati & Zamzami, 2017). Through a report entitled "Dirty Bankers: How HSBC is Financing Forest Destruction for Palm Oil," Greenpeace Indonesia claims that HSBC arranged loans and credit facilities worth \$16.3 billion to six companies, namely Bumitama Agri and Goodhope Asia Holdings Singapore, Malaysia's IOI Group, Noble Group, and POSCO Daewoo Korea and Salim Indonesia/Indofood Group. HSBC is well-known as a significant creditor in lending to the palm oil industry in the world (Siniwi, 2017). The six companies are accused of destroying tropical rainforests, land grabbing, operating without permits, employing children, and draining peatlands. Greenpeace Indonesia focuses on the banking sector considering the relationship between banks and businesses producing commodities through forest and land management in Indonesia.

Greenpeace Indonesia Campaigner Representative Annisa Rahmawati said that Indonesia's rainforests had been cleared with their impact, and significant banks worldwide are involved in financing the damage. The action taken by HSBC to cut ties with palm oil companies that contribute to environmental destruction is a good step. Besides, Greenpeace is willing to monitor closely to ensure the implementation of the policy runs appropriately and is expected to be a trigger for other banks to follow HSBC's steps. HSBC is credited with being self-reliant to advance Indonesia's zero-deforestation achievement. However, promises are only promising and do not live up to what HSBC has pledged through its 2017 policy for

NDPE. Evidence of non-achievement of policy implementation published by HSBC is disclosed by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) (Rees, 2020).

Based on the problems that are present in each sector, it can be concluded that the weakness of the network that Greenpeace Indonesia is trying to build is only issued policies and promises to implement NDPE and or are actively involved in HCS. Furthermore, the action initiatives that they convey to the public are only cursory and are motivated by pressure from various environmental activists such as Greenpeace Indonesia. Greenpeace Indonesia and other environmental activists who focus on saving the environment cannot hold on to this commitment because they are not accompanied by a written agreement or solid legal protection. So, it is easy for companies or banks to ignore the obligations they have published themselves. Greenpeace Indonesia and environmental activists can only rely on the publication of reports resulting from in-depth investigations of those claimed to have contributed to environmental destruction (Siniwi, 2017). From the description, it is undeniable that the acceleration of the OMP, which Greenpeace Indonesia is championing as one of the answers to forest and land problems in Indonesia, seems to have stagnated, and its progress is not being monitored. The misalignment of interests and views between sectors on the benefits and objectives of the OMP has made it more difficult for Greenpeace Indonesia to engage in policy formulation for sustainability.

#### *Technical and Financial capacity constraints*

Greenpeace Indonesia's ability to create a model that can give the government an idea of what CSOs will look like has become a plus for Greenpeace Indonesia. The form of the model developed by Greenpeace Indonesia to promote CSOs can be seen through the launch of the Kepo Hutan platform, which contains data and information needed by communities and groups interested in forests and land in Indonesia. This interactive map can be realized in just a year of making the Kepo Hutan interactive map, so it can reflect that the funding capacity of Greenpeace Indonesia is not a problem and the ability to develop the platform better (Coca, 2016). However, the smog problem due to forest and land fires in Indonesia is highlighted again because it has not been appropriately handled. Based on economic and political interests, the failure of NGOs to seek action and access to information can be an obstacle to be swifter in formulating a policy.

On the one hand, Suman (2020) provides a two-sided view about details about the location of fires and the stakeholders responsible for it is scarce. In contrast, on the other hand, when information is available, it is rarely easily accessible to the public. Access to this information can be the key to reconcile all actions taken by

environmental NGOs and even communities that highlight the haze and forest fires. Although the government often violates the right to access environmental information, today's society may find creative ways to gather and find out the information they need in unconventional methods by utilizing mobile technology and sensors operated by non-state actors. (Suman, 2020).

Greenpeace Indonesia collaborates with Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Global Forest Watch (GFW) to realize the Kepo Hutan map. Greenpeace Southeast Asia contributed to the visualization of the Kepo Hutan interactive map produced using open-source technology provided by GFW and as a benchmark for CSOs. As a provider and liaison with various groups with information and data related to forests and land in Indonesia, Greenpeace Indonesia will be included in the interactive map. However, the existing obstacle is the government's reluctance to open access to existing information so that the data presented is still limited and only in the form of unofficial copies from various sources. This deficiency can undoubtedly lead to the weakening of the discussion on the acceleration of OMP in Indonesia (Suman, 2020). Greenpeace Indonesia is technically hampered in obtaining more conservation data to complement the Kepo Hutan platform and push for CSOs as a national reference. Greenpeace Indonesia's access to data and information is essential to hold companies and the government accountable, which is why Greenpeace Indonesia is often involved in legal battles to force the government to release more detailed forest concessions and high-quality ownership data. Greenpeace Indonesia believes that obtaining this data can fulfill the demands of the public and other actors who have concerns, especially regarding forest and land fires. Concerning this data, it will enter and be on the Kepo Hutan interactive map with the goal of OMP getting complete data with the government as an empowered who can refer to Greenpeace Indonesia's Kepo Hutan (Coca, 2016). This obstacle makes it difficult for Greenpeace Indonesia to submit inputs and suggestions to policymakers for OMP because official data is difficult to access for the completeness of the map model that Greenpeace Indonesia and its partners are currently working on.

OMP itself is a plan of the Indonesian government that is quite minimally discussed by the public except for those interested in forest and land issues such as Greenpeace Indonesia and indigenous peoples who live side-by-side with forest and land areas. Therefore, accelerating the realization of OMP has not received much attention, especially from the international community. In its efforts to target the resolution of environmental issues, Greenpeace Indonesia is more likely to collaborate with other environmental activists through investigations and

preparation of reports used as weapons to pressure targets to change the direction of their policies and behaviour.

## CONCLUSION

This research focuses on the question of what obstacles Greenpeace Indonesia faces in pushing for Indonesia's One Map Policy (OMP), which attempts to answer using a policy engagement approach undertaken by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including Greenpeace Indonesia. This approach explains the relationship between CSOs, evidence, and policy processes and the influence of policies work and are closely interrelated to create policy engagement in responding to a particular issue. When the three of them run in sync, good policy engagement will achieve results that are on target, however, when one of them is not working, it should create obstacles which then hinder policy engagement so that the target issue does not stop. Obstacles in building policy engagement exist from two sides, namely internal and external. Internal barriers include insufficient capacity; strategy of using evidence is not effective; weak communication; weak network; and weak technical & financial capabilities. In addition, there are major external obstacles, namely political problems. Greenpeace Indonesia as part of the CSO is trying to push for the realization of OMP as an alternative solution to the prolonged problem of land and forest fires in Indonesia. Among the efforts made include the threat of strengthening the weapons moratorium through weaponry petitions which are then submitted to the government as well as major actions such as the launching of the interactive map platform 'Kepo Hutan' which is expected to be used as a model for the form of OMP needed by the community.

However, the internal process, up to the deadline promised by the government to realize the OMP, namely in 2019, in fact the OMP has not provided a point of hope for resolving the problem of land and forest fires in Indonesia. This then becomes a sign of weakness in pushing Greenpeace Indonesia to achieve the OMP agenda in Indonesia. Based on the policy engagement approach, the obstacles that Greenpeace Indonesia then faces are external obstacles. External obstacles stem from political problems that exist in Indonesia itself. Where OMP is part of a political policy process, the influence of contestation, pressure and elite interests has become an obstacle for Greenpeace Indonesia to be involved in a policy process that seems slow and not transparent. In fact, compiling data and information is important not only for Greenpeace Indonesia but also for indigenous peoples and the public who have an interest in the OMP issue.

While the internal obstacles faced by Greenpeace Indonesia include the weak communication that Greenpeace Indonesia is trying to develop. Even though Greenpeace Indonesia is able to build good communication, especially with indigenous peoples, essential communication such as with policy makers is still not optimal, this is indicated by the criticism received by PASPI regarding the launch of the Greenpeace Indonesia forest kepo map platform which is considered to be harassing the government and fulfilling the government's wishes, thing it is claimed that this can lead to misunderstandings and disputes between agencies due to data collection used in the interactive map of the forest group. The next obstacle is the weak development network, in which Greenpeace Indonesia has not maximally built a network with the government and also companies that are linked to the problem of land and forest fires in Indonesia as well as pushing the OMP agenda in Indonesia. Commitment and seriousness are considered by Greenpeace Indonesia in building a meaningful and sustainable network. And the internal obstacles faced by Greenpeace Indonesia in pushing for Indonesia's OMP agenda are technical and funding issues. With the interactive map feature of protected forests, Greenpeace Indonesia will have no difficulty in developing this platform in an effort to push the OMP agenda in Indonesia. However, technically Greenpeace Indonesia was hampered, especially in obtaining maximum conservation data as a complement to the forest kepo platform and then aimed at the OMP model as a national reference. These data and information are very important for Greenpeace Indonesia to obtain accountability from companies and the government for managing forests and land in Indonesia. Because of these things, Greenpeace Indonesia's efforts to accelerate the OMP agenda in Indonesia and as an alternative to solving the problem of forest and land fires in Indonesia have been hampered and have not provided a picture of success like Greenpeace Indonesia's previous actions. And the absence of any information on the continuation of the OMP agenda shows that the government has not put its full seriousness into efforts to resolve the problem of forest and land protection in Indonesia.

## REFERENCES

- Annisa Rahmawati, & Achmad, R. Y. (2019, September 3). *Greenpeace menghentikan keterlibatan dengan Wilmar-Unilever-Mondelez karena lemahnya komitmen mereka dalam menghentikan deforestasi dari rantai pasok - Greenpeace Indonesia*. Greenpeace Indonesia. <https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/publikasi/3677/greenpeace-menghentikan-keterlibatan-dengan-wilmar-unilever-mondelez-karena-lemahnya-komitmen-mereka-dalam-menghentikan-deforestasi-dari-rantai-pasok/>
- Bakry, U. S. (2017). METODE KUALITATIF DAN KUANTITATIF DALAM PENELITIAN HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL. In Dimaswids (Ed.), *METODE PENELITIAN HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL* (II, hal. 68–69). Pustaka Pelajar.
- BIG. (2017, Januari 28). *One Map Policy Satu Peta untuk Satu Indonesia | Geospasial untuk Negeri*. Pusat Pengelolaan dan Penyebarluasan Informasi Geospasial Badan Informasi Geospasial (BIG). <https://portal.inasdi.or.id/home/node/64>
- Coca, N. (2016, Oktober 19). *Mapping an end to fires in Indonesia with Kepo Hutan - MobLab*. MobLab. <https://mobilisationlab.org/stories/mapping-end-fires-indonesia-kepo-hutan/>
- Court, J., Mendizabal, E., Osborne, D., & Young, J. (2006). Policy
- Greenpeace. (2007). *Annual Report 07*. greenpeace.org
- Greenpeace. (2009, Agustus 5). *Victory for the Boreal Forest! Kimberly-Clark announces new paper policy | Greenpeace International*. Greenpeace International. <https://wayback.archive-it.org/9650/20200403023708/http://p3-raw.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/victory-for-the-boreal-forest/>
- Greenpeace. (2017). *Bankir kotor*. [https://wayback.archive-it.org/9650/20200418052302/http://p3-raw.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/forests/2017/GP\\_DirtyBankers\\_Report\\_LowRes\\_BAH.pdf](https://wayback.archive-it.org/9650/20200418052302/http://p3-raw.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/forests/2017/GP_DirtyBankers_Report_LowRes_BAH.pdf)

- Greenpeace. (2018). *Final Countdown - now or never to reform the palm oil industry*.  
<https://www.greenpeace.org/international/publication/18455/the-final-countdown-forests-indonesia-palm-oil/>
- Greenpeace Indonesia. (2016a). *PUBLISH MAPS, STOP FIRES, SAVE FORESTS*.  
<https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-southeastasia-stateless/2019/04/b7ba3691-b7ba3691-kepo-hutan-transparency-briefer-english.pdf>
- Greenpeace Indonesia. (2016b, Oktober 9). *Transparansi Peta, Kunci Keberhasilan Pengelolaan Hutan Berkelanjutan - Greenpeace Indonesia*. Greenpeace .  
<https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers/2363/transparansi-peta-kunci-keberhasilan-pengelolaan-hutan-berkelanjutan/>
- Greenpeace Indonesia. (2020). *KARHUTLA DALAM 5 TAHUN TEAKHIR*. Greenpeace Southeast Asia-Indonesia.
- Jong, H. N. (2018, Maret 8). *Public access to Indonesian plantation data still mired in bureaucracy*.
- Putri, B. (2019). Upaya Greepeace Dalam Menangani Kerusakan Lingkungan Pasca Kebakaran Hutan Dan Lahan Di Indonesia. *Journal of Chemical Information and Modeling*, 53(9), 1689–1699.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>
- Raco, J. (2018). *Metode penelitian kualitatif: jenis, karakteristik dan keunggulannya* (A. L & J. B. Soedarmanta (ed.)). PT Grasindo.  
<https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/mfzuj>
- Rahmawati, A. (2019a, April 24). *Tackling Deforestation in the Palm Oil Industry: Quo Vadis Private and Public Sectors Commitments?* Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung - Southeast Asia. <https://th.boell.org/en/2019/04/24/tackling-deforestation-palm-oil-industry-quo-vadis-private-and-public-sectors-commitments>
- Rahmawati, A., & Zamzami. (2017, Februari 21). *Kebijakan Baru “Nol Deforestasi” HSBC Langkah Maju Keberlanjutan Pendanaan Kelapa Sawit - Greenpeace Indonesia*. Greenpeace Indonesia.  
<https://www.greenpeace.org/indonesia/siaran-pers/2323/kebijakan-nol-deforestasi-hsbc/>

- Rees, T. (2020, Februari 8). *HSBC has not cut its ties to deforestation despite pledge, say activists*. The Telegraph. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/02/08/hsbc-has-not-cut-ties-deforestation-despite-pledge-say-activists/>
- Santesson, P. (2011). *A Study of Greenpeace Campaigns*. Södertörn University.
- Septiadi, A. (2016, Maret 16). PASPI: Peta Digital Greenpeace Lecehkan Pemerintah - Majalah Sawit Indonesia. *Majalah Sawit Indonesia*. <https://sawitindonesia.com/paspi-peta-digital-greenpeace-lecehkan-pemerintah/>
- Shahab, N. (2016). Indonesia : One Map Policy. *Open Government Partnership*.
- Silviana, A. (2019). Kebijakan Satu Peta (One Map Policy) Mencegah Konflik di Bidang Administrasi Pertanahan. *Administrative Law and Governance Journal*, 2(2), 195–205. <https://doi.org/10.14710/alj.v2i2.195-205>
- Siniwi, R. M. (2016, Maret 16). *Greenpeace Launches Interactive Map to Track Deforestation, Fires in Indonesia*. JAKARTA GLOBE. <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/greenpeace-launches-interactive-map-track-deforestation-fires-indonesia/>
- Siniwi, R. M. (2017, Januari 17). *Greenpeace's "Dirty Bankers" Report Accuses HSBC of Funding Deforestation in Indonesia*. Jakarta Globe. <https://jakartaglobe.id/context/greenpeace-slams-hsbc-funding-destructive-indonesian-palm-oil-firms/>
- Soraya, A. (2018, September 19). *Greenpeace : Wilmar Internasional Biang Deforestasi di Indonesia - Tirto.ID*. Tirto.id. <https://tirto.id/greenpeace-wilmar-internasional-biang-deforestasi-di-indonesia-cZUD>
- Suman, A. B. (2020). Making visible politically masked risks : Inspecting unconventional data visualization of the Southeast Asian haze. *Data Visualization in Society*, April. <https://doi.org/10.5117/9789463722902>
- Virgy, M. A., Djuyandi, Y., & Darmawan, W. B. (2020). Strategi Jaringan Advokasi Transnasional Greenpeace Indonesia Terkait Isu Deforestasi Hutan Indonesia oleh Wilmar International. *Journal of Political Issues*, 1(2), 74–91. <https://doi.org/10.33019/jpi.v1i2.9>

- WALHI. (2020a). *KEBIJAKAN SATU PETA UNTUK RAKYAT BUKAN KORPORASI JAKARTA*. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI). <https://www.walhi.or.id/kebijakan-satu-peta-untuk-rakyat-bukan-korporasi>
- WALHI. (2020b, Agustus 27). *Kebijakan Satu Peta menuju Indonesia Maju“Pengakuan Wilayah Adat Dalam Kebijakan satu Peta”* | WALHI. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI). <https://www.walhi.or.id/kebijakan-satu-peta-menuju-indonesia-maju-pengakuan-wilayah-adat-dalam-kebijakan-satu-peta>



## How Iran Overrides IAEA to Examine Iran's Nuclear Energy Development

Widya Sihotang

### Widya Sihotang

Affiliation : Intern at Purnomo  
Yusgiantoro Center  
City : Jakarta  
Country : Indonesia  
Email :  
[widyasihotang29@gmail.com](mailto:widyasihotang29@gmail.com)

### History

Submission : 6 July 2022  
Review : 9 September 2022  
Completed  
Accepted : 15 November 2022  
Available : 10 December 2022  
Online

### DOI :

[10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.130-140](https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.130-140)

### Abstract

In human life, weapons of mass destruction pose a threat to all. Since the era of war has ended, the international world has no longer felt the presence of weapons of mass destruction. The research question found by the author in this article is Iran's efforts to deal with the IAEA which implements a unilateral policy to conduct inspections of Iran's nuclear energy. In addition, the author also limits the discussion to only the efforts made by Iran in rejecting the IAEA's actions to examine nuclear development in Iran. Before discussing these points, the author will provide a discussion of the reasons why the IAEA wants to examine Iran's nuclear development first. With the limitations of this research, the author can describe the discussion specifically and get good results. Neoliberal Institutionalism as one of the major theories of International Relations is the main point of view used by the author to analyze the formulation of the problem. Basically, Iran did not accept the examination submitted by the IAEA because Iran found the fact that the IAEA allegedly leaked some Iranian nuclear secrets so that Iran had lost confidence in the IAEA.

**Key Words:** IAEA, Iran, Nuclear Energy Development, Functionalism

### Cite this article :

Sihotang, W. (2022). How Iran Overrides IAEA to Examine Iran's Nuclear Energy Development. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(2), 130–140.  
<https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.130-140>

## INTRODUCTION

Energy is one of the most significant components in people's life because most of their needs are tied to it, both in terms of clothing and food as well as natural necessities like sunlight. Energy is also frequently used to help communal activities, such as electricity and transportation, in addition to addressing communal requirements. However, many countries continue to rely on fossil fuels to fulfill their energy needs, causing fossil fuel availability to be in short supply at the moment. As a result, countries are beginning to shift to alternative energy sources, such as nuclear power. However, nuclear energy is only used by a few countries because nuclear energy is not available to all countries. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is one of the energy sources that is thought to be capable of meeting human life's needs. When used for good purposes, nuclear energy plays a critical role in ensuring human welfare.

Apart from fulfilling human needs, at the same time, nukes can also become tools of human destruction, where the military use nukes as the main ingredients for creating weapons of mass destruction. In human life, weapons of mass destruction pose a threat to all. The first nuclear bomb test was conducted by allied nations in 1939 after Albert Einstein wrote to US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt that an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction was a potential base for weapons of mass destruction (Mukhlis, 1997). The United States later supported the construction of the Manhattan project that was part of the nuclear power plant. The United States government provided relief of some 6,000 U.S. dollars in 1940 for the construction of the project. In the world of weaponry, a nuclear bomb is one of the most dangerous weapons because a single launch can devastate a large enough area.

The world history record summarizes the use of nuclear bombs in the wars in which the United States used nuclear bombs to destroy the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during World War II. The explosive capability of nuclear bombs attracted the attention of super power states to help their country's military forces. But the explosion of the nuclear bomb left a big trauma to society in the world that the international world began to move to prevent similar events. The UN, an international, overshadowing organization of countries around the world, has decided that a new agency focused on restrictions on the use and development of nuclear energy and that it is under the UN's auspices. It is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) founded on July 29, 1957. With the advent of the IAEA, in 1968 there was a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that curbed nuclear weapons possession and was one of the regulations governing the implementation of nuclear energy development systems by members of the IAEA (IAEA, 2011).

Since the era of war has ended, the international world has no longer felt the presence of weapons of mass destruction. But the absence of weapons of mass destruction on the surface does not ensure that nuclear nations do not develop their nuclear power. In fact, some countries that have nuclear powers are still developing nuclear power in their countries. One of the countries is Iran, where Iran has joined an international organization that is in the field of nuclear restrictions, but in reality it is not considered to be a force for peace. The announcement of the issue was made by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, who announced that Iran is still developing its country's nuclear weapons and is also being used for military purposes. This runs counter to Iran's commitment as a member of the IAEA that joined as early as 1958. Moreover, in 1970 Iran also became one of the countries that signed the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and also established protocol for signing the agreement in 1997. In response to these allegations, Iran has always responded that they are developing the nuclear warhead for only the needs of electricity and is under the assumption that the manufacture of nuclear weapons is a big mistake.

The statute states that each state that signs and ratifies the agreement must carry out its duties as a member, whereby reporting on all atomic and nuclear activities being carried out by the country, can be included in article viii discussing an information exchange under the IAEA (IAEA, 2011). Not only that, the IAEA also has the right to monitor and monitor every nuclear activity carried out by its member states, from site to site. Since the many issues about Iran's nuclear development circulated, the IAEA on February 23, 2012, finally announced that the rumors were true. This is proven by the disappearance of a small amount of uranium between 19.8 kilograms of uranium research sites in Iran, where Iran has reached 20% uranium for enrichment and another 70% for use in nuclear weapons (Hendrasica, 2007). That fact was later reinforced by Iran's refusal of IAEA team of experts to visit what is thought to be a nuclear weapons development site, a military base in Parchin. Therefore, this research aims to analysi how Iran overrides the IEAE in dealing with nuclear as energy using unilateral scheme. It will be assessed from neoliberalism institutionalism from the International Relations studies.

The study of literature that the author used in this paper is the journal of Akbar & Kodimerinda (2012) under the title "Iran's nuclear development and diplomacy to IAEA". One of the conditions for the nuclear state is to have advanced nuclear technologies, and Iran becomes one of the countries that own the technology. Iran is a threat to the world as its nuclear power reaches Israel and the United States also considers it a rival. But to keep its country safe and stable, Iran has declared that its nuclear technology is only for peace purposes that Iran is allowed to develop its

nuclear power. In the meantime, Iran also allows the IAEA to check on its country's nuclear technologies. But the United States always claims that Iran develops its nuclear weapons not only for peaceful purposes but also for nuclear weapons, so with its power, the United States has been able to influence the UN to impose economic sanctions on Iran. This was done in order for Iran to call off its nuclear program. But it does not affect Iran because Iran thinks that nuclear energy is superior to oil.

A second journal published as literature review is a journal written by Mikail & Fathoni (2019) entitled "Iran's nuclear development program and its effect on Iranian society (1957-2006 c.e.), in which article Mikail & Fathoni discusses Iran's nuclear development that has been developed that has resulted in much of the conflicts and conflicts of the west. The problem in the journal is the beginning of Iran's nuclear program and the response from the Middle East to Iran's actions. Research into the history of Iran's nuclear program in 1957 and there is a collaboration between Mohammad Shah Reza Pahlavi and the United States when Dwight d. Eisenhower became President of the United States (Mikail & Fathoni, 2019). In the aftermath of the Iranian war, Iran's enthusiasm for developing its nuclear program is increasing even in some conditions that Iran puts its nuclear interests ahead of its people's well-being. Just as the first journal mentioned, it also mentions the U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran, which has left Iran in a bad way for oil and gas exports.

The last literature used by the author in this paper is the Sundari Journal (2020) with the research objective of 'United States Strategy in Suppressing Iran's Nuclear Development'. This journal discusses the relationship between Iran and the United States which initially improved and cooperated in an agreement called the JCPOA. In the agreement, the United States and several other nuclear countries agreed to limit their nuclear energy and carry out development only for peaceful purposes. But in 2018, the United States decided to leave the agreement because Iran was deemed to have violated the agreement.

## RESEARCH METHOD

In analyzing and answering the questions listed in the problem formulation, the author will use qualitative research methods. Qualitative research method is research that tries to understand the meanings that come from social or humanitarian problems (Creswell, 2003). The data in non-numeric form that will be used in this paper will be analyzed and evaluated using qualitative research methods. The author chose the qualitative method because basically this method


does not have a rigid procedure where researchers are free to explore an event or object of study in research. But even so, researchers are still required to provide an in-depth and detailed analysis. The author collects data on Iran's efforts in dealing with the IAEA which implements a unilateral policy to conduct inspections of Iran's nuclear energy using document-based data collection techniques such as research reports, official websites, journals and reference books as well as other supporting data on various related websites. with this research.

From these sources, the author will find secondary data which will then be poured into a report on the results of this study. In addition, the author will also conduct an interview technique to obtain primary data with the sources intended by the author. The data that will be used by the author in this study are in the form of official documents issued by the government so that this research can produce a novelty. In addition to interviewing the embassy, the author will also conduct interviews with selected sources that are relevant to the author's research topic. The topic of discussion that will be described by the author in this study is the efforts made by Iran in rejecting the IAEA's actions to examine nuclear development in Iran. Before discussing these points, the author will provide a discussion of the reasons the IAEA wants to examine Iran's nuclear development first.

In this study, the author uses the Neoliberal Institutionalism Theory as a theoretical point of view. Neoliberal Institutionalism as one of the major theories of IR believes that there is a pluralism of IR actors including states, bureaucracies, international government organizations, international non-governmental organizations, anti-establishment groups, transnational corporations, and individuals whose actions have transnational impacts that bring various interrelated issues. overlapping (overlapping mutiple issues) (Hadiwinata, 2017). The author then uses the work of David Mitrany to provide an analysis of the theory. In his work entitled *The Functional Approach to World Organization* (1948) and *The Functional Theory of Politics* (1975), the author finds the concept of functionalism which will analyze the problem formulation in this study. An organization at the global or regional level can last a long time if it is built on the premise of efficient administration and minimal use of resources (Mitrany, 1975).

An organization that is run efficiently, coupled with the provision of appropriate incentives and sanctions for its members can strengthen the solidity that is essential for world peace and order (Popoviciu, 2010). In his journal, Mitrany focuses on the reasons and ways in which a global or regional organization can survive. Some countries in this world basically still have not been able to develop their country with their own power so they still need help from other countries. Therefore, Mitrany gives full hope to the formation of international or regional organizations

that are adapted to their functions so that there is no overlap between fellow organizations. In addition, Mitrany also emphasized that all countries in the world can unite in functional cooperation if there is no military intervention from superpower countries in the organization. The scheme below shows how theoretical framework in analysing this research.



## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Basically, the Iranian nuclear case is motivated by Iran's activities which are enriching uranium which can be used as the main material for making nuclear reactors which started before 2003 (Hendrasica, 2007). The IAEA, which is the nuclear watchdog, suspects Iran of violating its commitments at the IAEA because during that period Iran was proven to have built another uranium enrichment building. But Iran denies the violation because the new facilities were set up only to assist the nuclear program in the interests of Iran's future. Iran and the IAEA re-established a work program on the development of nuclear weapons in Iran in 2007. All the accusations in the Iran nuclear case at that time had been well resolved by the IAEA. However, in 2018, the IAEA again announced that Iran's problem was still unresolved, namely Iran's military involvement in Iran's nuclear program. Then recently on May 25, 2012, IAEA leader Yukiya Amano reported to the Security Council and the IAEA Council that Iran questioned the authenticity of the evidence that had been submitted which showed that Iran was indeed developing nuclear weapons so that the Iranian nuclear case was still unresolved (Hendrasica, 2007).

At the time of its meeting, the IAEA claimed that Iran did not provide a detailed explanation so that suspicions about Iran's nuclear power resurfaced.

According to Iran, through its Ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran will only agree to the request of the IAEA delegation to visit the Parchin military site, if the two sides have negotiated and agreed on a certain framework of cooperation that addresses the problems of both parties (Samore, 2015). ). Parchin became the main target of the IAEA in the request for the visit because the region is considered a place where Iran is developing its nuclear weapons and the issue is being promoted by western countries. But the request was rejected by Iran because under the NPT agreement, Iran has no legal obligation to accept the request. The number of parties who started to get involved in Iran's nuclear condition, such as negotiations from President Barack Obama with the aim of avoiding a war finally prompted Iran to give access to Parchin to the IAEA in 2012. The main reason for Iran's rejection of the IAEA visit to the military area Iran is Iran's view that sees that the IAEA has become part of western countries that are trying to divulge Iranian military secrets. Accusations from other countries stating that Iran is developing nuclear weapons have never subsided, even today they are still ongoing. And Iran has always denied these accusations because Iran is a member of the IAEA and also a country that signed the NPT so that Iran has the right to develop its nuclear weapons for peace purposes. This right prompted Iran to sign and ratify the treaty.

In relation to the case of Iran's rejection of the examination of nuclear energy development by the IAEA into the territory of its country, especially the Iranian military area, namely Parchin, the Iranian side said that as a member of the NPT they had carried out every provision in the NPT agreement so that there was no need for an inspection by the IAEA. which in this case is the supervisor of nuclear energy development activities (Kerrl, 2012). All of Iran's commitments and agreements with the IAEA and the NPT have been carried out by Iran well so that the accusations handed down by western countries to Iran become an act of discrimination against Iran and also until now there has been no concrete evidence against the accusation of developing nuclear weapons. Apart from the reasons previously explained, another factor that pushed Iran to refuse the IAEA to conduct an inspection of Iran's nuclear weapons was the absence of a framework for cooperation made by the two parties in which the framework became access to enter Iran's territory. The two sides have often negotiated to resolve the issue, but have always failed because the IAEA and Iran have imposed too much on their own will. In addition, in every agreement that has been agreed, Iran has no obligation to open access to Iran so that the IAEA always uses UN Security Council Resolutions to

pressure Iran. However, due to the absence of accurate evidence, the UN Security Council has also not been able to conduct an examination of Iran.

In the concept of functionalism, Iran's actions are a form of the country's disapproval of the IAEA's alignment with the United States as an international organization. The IAEA's approach to Iran to limit Iran's nuclear development would be successful if there were no other powers to intervene in the organization. But in reality, the IAEA is still promoted by the United States. Iran, which basically sees the United States as an enemy, begins to doubt the existence of the IAEA because one of the main purposes of the IAEA to conduct inspections on Iran is because of a request from the United States. In addition, in the NPT agreement where all nuclear countries began to cooperate to deal with nuclear in their respective countries, the United States in 2018 decided to leave the agreement. Iran, which is the main reason the United States left the agreement, sees the United States' action as a step to seek safety. Meanwhile, Iran, which is accused of nuclear cases, still maintains its commitment to the NPT. Until the era of the new president, the United States finally rejoined the NPT and made efforts to negotiate on the Iranian nuclear issue. And this effort was also responded to by Iran so that Iran provided more detailed clarity regarding its country's nuclear development.

Iran's decision to reduce monitoring marks its latest step and one of the most significant steps it has taken to limit compliance with the JCPOA since the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018 and reimposed tough economic sanctions on Iran. Tehran began violating the deal one year later, in 2019 but stated that all breaches of the agreement, including the reduction of its monitoring, would be cancelled if JCPOA sanctions were lifted. On May 24, 2021, Iran and the IAEA extended an agreement to maintain surveillance footage at declared nuclear sites by no later than one month. The agreement will expire on June 24, a week after Iran's presidential election on June 18. The extension is designed to allow more time for negotiations in Vienna to bring Iran and the United States back into compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. Many have recommended that they take advantage of this opportunity which has been provided in good faith by Iran and all sanctions imposed can be revoked in a practical and verifiable manner. The statement was made by Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran's representative to the UN watchdog.

## CONCLUSION

In an organization or agreement, each party involved will form an agreement in which all members are required to comply with these rules. Likewise with Iran and the IAEA where the IAEA is an international organization and Iran is a member country. In the initial process of joining Iran with the IAEA, both parties have formed an agreement that contains the rights and obligations of each party. The IAEA as a forum has the task of inspecting the nuclear development of each of its member countries. In this case, Iran rejected several examinations proposed by the IAEA because of several studies that Iran had conducted, the IAEA allegedly leaked some of Iran's nuclear secrets so that Iran had lost confidence in the IAEA. In addition, the IAEA is also suspected of having hidden cooperation with the United States where the purpose of the examination carried out by the IAEA is promoted by the United States. In the agreement that has been formed since the beginning of Iran's joining the IAEA, Iran has no obligation to open access to the IAEA to verify Iran's nuclear. The last point that became the reason for Iran's refusal of inspection from the IAEA was the UN Security Council Resolution which was asked to verify Iran's nuclear power while there was no accurate evidence showing that Iran's nuclear endangered the world. The IAEA's actions were strongly rejected by Iran because the accusations basically did not have a legal basis.

## REFERENCES

- Akbar, H., & Kodimerinda, P. (2012). Pengembangan Nuklir Iran dan Diplomasi kepada IAEA. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*, 14.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches 2nd ed.* California: SAGE Publications.
- Hadiwinata, B. S. (2017). *Studi dan Teori Hubungan Internasional: Arus Utama, Alternatif, dan Reflektivis.* Bandung: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
- Hendrasica, A. (2007). " *Perspektif Hukum Internasional Terhadap Pengembangan Teknologi Nuklir, studi kasus: Dugaan pengembangan senjata nuklir Iran.* Semarang: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Diponegoro.
- IAEA. (2011). *The IAEA International Fact Finding Mission.* Preliminary Summary.
- Khan, Saira. (2010). *Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation.* New York: Routledge.
- Kerrl, P. K. (2012). Iran's Nuclear Program : Tehran's compliance with international obligations. *Congressional Research Service.*
- MacAvoy, Joseph J. (2004). *Nuclear Space and the Earth Environment: The Benefits, Dangers, and Legality of Nuclear Power and Propulsion in Outer Space.* Retrieved from: <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol29/iss1/6> (Diakses pada tanggal 4 Desember 2014).
- Mikail, K., & Fathoni, A. (2019). Program Pengembangan Nuklir Iran dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Masyarakat Iran (1957-2006 M). *Jurnal Studi Sosial dan Politik*, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1-16.
- Mitrany, D. (1975). The Functional Theory of Politics. *International Affairs Journal*
- Mukhlis, A. (1997). *Pengantar Teknologi Nuklir.* Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta.
- Popoviciu, A. (2010). David Mitrany and Functionalism: The Beginnings of Functionalism. *Revista Romana de Geografie Politica*, Vol. 1, No. 12 , 162.

- Samore, G. (2015). *The Iran Nuclear Deal A Definitive Guide*. Cambridge, MA:  
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IranDealDefinitiveGuide.pdf>.
- Yazdani, Enayatullah & Rizwan Hussain. (2006). *United States' Policy Towards  
Iran after the Islamic Revolution: An Iranian Perspective*. London: Sage  
Publications.



## China's efforts to achieve energy interests in the Arctic region

Mega Anggraini, Inda Mustika Permata, Sofia Trisni

### Mega Anggraini

Affiliation : International Relations,  
Universitas Andalas  
 City : Padang  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email :  
[megaanggraini451@gmail.com](mailto:megaanggraini451@gmail.com)

### Inda Mustika Permata

Affiliation : International Relations,  
Universitas Andalas  
 City : Padang  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email :  
[indamustikapermata@soc.unand.ac.id](mailto:indamustikapermata@soc.unand.ac.id)

### Sofia Trisni

Affiliation : International Relations,  
Universitas Andalas  
 City : Padang  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email :  
[sofi\\_hi01@yahoo.com](mailto:sofi_hi01@yahoo.com)

### History

Submission : 16 August 2022  
 Review : 15 October 2022  
 Completed  
 Accepted : 10 November 2022  
 Available : 9 December 2022  
 Online

### DOI :

[10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.108-118](https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.108-118)

### Abstract

The study examines Chinese efforts to obtain arctic energy interests during crises such as the melting of ice caps and not the ownership of much of the region itself. For the BRI to effectively facilitate the development of micro, small, and medium enterprises, alternative energy sources must be supported. However, it is challenging the policies of some countries in the arctic region. The study utilized qualitative methods and secondary data. Using Bernard D.D. Cole's energy security theories, we examine the challenges that China and Chinese diplomacy would face. China has utilized its diplomatic relations and cooperation to promote global energy diplomacy by scouring or exploiting existing resources through the first two stages of global energy diplomacy. Second, the birth of a policy is that of silk polar road. This is a tangible form of white paper released in arctic, which contained Chinese interests and objectives and Chinese responsibilities to the arctic region.

**Key Words:** Arctic, Energy challenge, Energy diplomacy, energy security, China.

### Cite this article :

Salim, F. (2022). Analysis of Saudi Arabia Intervention in Decisive Storm Operations in Yemen. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(1), 93–106.  
<https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss1.2022.93-106>

## INTRODUCTION

The Chinese dream is Xi Jinping's vision for the party and the country (Liu Qibao, 2013). This is because this vision has developed into a strategic idea to develop socialism specifically tailored to Chinese circumstances. According to this vision, China is striving to become an existentially strong, prosperous, and welfare state free from foreign invasions, where domestic development free of foreign investment encourages China to become more independent (Wang, 2013). To achieve this goal, in 2013, Xi Jinping initiated the One Belt One Road initiative, better known as the Belt Road Initiative (Enright, 2016). Energy security is one of the principal objectives of national policy based on energy needs and energy demand for the industries that drive China's economic growth. There are many energy-rich countries in Asia, but the price of oil is high, and distribution routes are unsafe. The region's abundant supply in the Middle East, affordable prices, but even unstable political conditions could hit oil distribution routes.

For that reason China began looking for alternatives to meet energy needs and supply (Pelaudeix, 2018). In addition, China's interest in the Arctic may be driven by its potential energy, commercial, and geopolitical gains, each of which comes with its own challenges (Nakano, 2018). This region is significant to an energy alternative to China because of its geography and strategic potential. Apart from its natural potential, it is surrounded (Ademuty & Pakpahan, 2016) by eight countries scattered across the American continent, Asia and Europe. These countries are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Iceland, Sweden and the United States. Eighty-seven percent of the world's conventional oil reserves and thirty percent of its undiscovered gas are located in the seven boroughs. As this number suggests, the arctic has vast energy reserves that can serve as alternatives to China.

China has been present in the Arctic since the 1990s. However, it was not until 2007 that it became an observer on the Arctic Council. In 2013, it was granted observer status. Across the Arctic region, Chinese cooperation with Russia in the energy sector and Canada and improved relations with Denmark in the past year demonstrate its promotion of relations, diplomacy, and economic activity (Pezard, 2018; Pezard et al., 2022). For China, achieving energy interests in the region is a challenge because of Russian dominance through the new Arctic policy. The two objections from the United States strongly dispute China's 'arctic' claims and criticize the activities carried out in the Arctic.

Considering geography and the challenges China faces, China's participation and role in the Arctic is an imperative issue to discuss. Despite China's right and obligation to serve as observers, that doesn't mean it can easily access the Arctic

without hindrances. Therefore, this study attempt to discuss about the China's effort in achieving energy interest in the Arctic.

## **METHOD**

This study uses a qualitative method or approach which attempts to explain the quality of a study, explaining meaning, conditions, and data that can't be answered by numbers. In this qualitative research, the approach employed is a descriptive approach, namely research that explains and explores social phenomena and the researcher explains it in words so as to produce a detailed and comprehensive report. To collect information, we used secondary data from books, journals, reports, and news based on the keywords such as Arctic region, China's foreign policy, energy interest, and China's diplomacy. After the information collected, we used energy security theories. Furthermore, we can draw the conclusion. Data then categorize as Chinese efforts and interest.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

Among China's overall activities in the Arctic region are cooperation and scientific research due to the region's climate and weather conditions. The Chinese government has developed a new delivery route, energy activity, and lucrative trade in order to explore the region potential via China's expanded delivery routes, energy activity and lucrative trade (Alam et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2015). For China to establish cooperation or find a reliable partner, there are several ways, such as: first, the recognition and respect of Arctic and non-Arctic states under international law; second, developing mutual understanding and trust in its Arctic regions, while supporting solutions to problems and providing assistance; third, a broader transregional and comprehensive approach to addressing the transregional problem. And, lastly, promoting mutual interests in peace, stability, and sustainable development at the North Pole. By analyzing the information using the theory, the authors conclude that Chinese energy diplomacy is intended to promote Chinese energy worldwide through diplomatic relations and cooperation with several Arctic countries. Further, China released a policy regarding its energy interests with the support of an observer at the arctic council.

### ***Global energy supply promotion efforts are being made by China***

China's policy and its activities in the Arctic region were analyzed through three aspects of energy security: energy availability, affordability for the nations, and military capabilities. Related to some of the problems found in the Arctic region, such as: (a) a large area with no ownership status. (b) the Arctic has other natural resources, and there are many minerals that are untapped, such as gold, copper, iron, tin, platinum, nickel, zinc, and diamonds in the region, and (c) melting of ice in much of the Arctic. As part of this, China began to focus its energy several years ago on forging or strengthening existing partnerships.

The authors later found out that there were promotional efforts made by China. Due to unstable domestic demand and production, China began to invest in both petroleum and natural gas from 2003. Some regions such as Asia, Africa and the Middle East are the dominant areas for China's importing energy (Lai, 2007), but there are some factors like prices, the distribution of oil as well as the politicisation of some unstable region countries encouraged China to seek alternative areas such as the arctic. The presence of China in arctic international cooperation has increased significantly since 2007 and beyond, when it began sending delegates to the arctic council's senior council meeting (Koivurova et al., 2019).

China's promotion efforts, in turn, through diplomatic relations and cooperation are as follows:

As a first step, China and Russia should cooperate. In the 1990s and 2000, a number of partnerships were formed in the oil and natural gas sectors, including Rosneft's partnership with the Chinese national petroleum company (CNPC) and Rosneft's partnership with Sinopec. NOVATEK, CNPC and several foreign companies, including the French, are part of the LNG project which involves the development of gas fields on the east side of the Yamal peninsula in western Siberia and the construction of LNG factories and terminals (Mazneva, 2017). Moreover, Russia offers China participation in many oil and other energy projects as well as offers to export some of the oil as agreed. Furthermore, China offers a number of long-term loans to support several projects which make it easier for China to invest in Russian companies until the Chinese Silk Road Fund has a stake of 9% in the Russian company (Moe, 2017)

Second, promotion through Chinese and Canadian cooperation. For Canada, China is the largest partner and investor in some projects. Through a number of other partnerships, Canada gained investments in order to fund its company. This partnership offers China the opportunity to be active in some projects. It could even

become the largest shareholder in a Canadian oil company. This could help meet the country's energy needs. Moreover, through this relationship, China could pursue access to the Arctic and participate in activities related to it (Jiang, 2005)

Third, a renewed relationship with Norway benefits both sides. For China, looking further to improve relations as easier access to the north and the ability to use the Arctic Sea route to transport goods to Europe, it would cut between 12 and 15 days in transport time, with enormous economic advantages (Jiang, 2005). Norway must have made an investment in China and made China a manufacturing market.

Fourth, China became a lucrative partner after it entered into a three-way partnership with the Danish state. Both Denmark and China have benefited from this partnership. China has invested in Denmark to promote smooth development and infrastructure renewal. China has access to regions that have adequate energy resources for its energy supply, such as land metals and possible rights to Arctic ports (Tillman et al., 2018). Fifth, China and Iceland have established a joint Arctic science observatory since 2021. Plans expanded in 2017, with work in observatories now including the atmosphere, oceans, glaciers, geophysical, remote sensing and biology (Chun, 2020).

The sixth promotion involves collaboration with Finland. Accordingly, China proposes that the two countries utilize China Railway Express and other facilities to increase two-way trade, engage in third cooperation, discuss the possibility of Arctic delivery routes, and jointly create a polar silk road. There is also a collaboration between China and Finland in the field of climate research, monitoring the Arctic environment and navigation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2019).

From the foregoing it can be seen that China was very active in carrying out this promotion. During the period 2003-2007, oil was imported from some areas, including the Arctic. In the period of 2010-2019, China did a number of collaborations with large countries such as Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Finland. As previously discussed, China and some countries have been able to maximize their profits through established relationships and partnerships. In exchange for the investment, China was given access and a chance to participate in some existing projects. Some countries have used Chinese investment as a way to fund projects.

This indicates that China is pursuing global energy promotion and has sustained such an effort over a long period of time. It is especially intense because this

promotion is not only done annually. By holding part of the shares of a number of companies it has worked with, China has demonstrated its power.

### ***Release of Policy In the Energy Interests***

Through China's position as an observer on the arctic council (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014). Acknowledged by the countries of the Arctic region, China is the pinnacle of energy diplomacy for the region. China released a white paper with a policy of focusing on the arctic and declaring itself "stakeholders" in the arctic and "arctic state arctic. China describes itself as 'one of the continental countries closest to the Arctic Circle,' although there is no region of China above the Arctic Circle or the northern border (The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2018). The Chinese white paper on its arctic policy was published in early 2018 amid worries and concerns about China's role as an observer of the arctic council. This document provides stronger international cooperation in the construction of infrastructure and operations of the arctic sea route by together building the silk road (Tillman et al., 2018).

The interests of China can be seen as two principal objectives: first, to contribute to the governance of environmental problems that are of global concern and, secondly, to benefit from the economic potential of the Arctic region (Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012). Observers are generally regarded as weak actors, as they have no vote in the decision-making process of the Arctic Council. As an external actor outside the region, China's participation as an observer remains the ideal and perhaps the only way that allows China to gain formal access to the Arctic government and the decision-making process (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014).

The circumstances and natural conditions of the Arctic region had a direct impact on parts of China. . China has experienced sudden climate change due to the depletion of arctic sea ice. This has changed atmospheric circulation at high altitudes, contributing to sudden climate change. During 2007-2008, extreme fog contamination and global warming caused severe snowstorms in central and south China. Due to loss of Arctic sea ice and snow in previous autumn, poor ventilation conditions were found on the east China plains in 2013 (Steinveg, 2020; Zou et al., 2017). Not just the environment, the Chinese interest in the arctic region is seen from the economic sector. The Arctic has a strategic location with abundant energy resources and is likely to be a pathway for international trade. As the world's largest energy consumer, China needs a constant supply of energy resources to sustain its economic growth. An untapped supply of natural gas and oil in the north could meet China's demand for energy resources and the need to supply them (Gavrilov et al., 2017).

In addition, China claims that the arctic is a 'golden route or passage' for delivery (Brady, 2017). The arctic route provides the shortest delivery route connecting east Asia to Europe and North America. It is estimated that arctic shipping via the northern sea route would cut short the shipping trip between north China and northern Europe and at least 40% compared with the conventional route through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal (Chen, 2012). As a result of melting the arctic ice sheet, three major shipping routes will be opened all the way to China.

First, the use of the northern passage, which is intended for commercial ocean transport during the summer, will offer a more than 6,400 km (4,000 mi) route to Europe and alleviate China's Malacca dilemma. Secondly, it facilitated Chinese access to the snow dragon (*xue long*) for such trips as learning about navigation through the Arctic Sea passage and ocean environments, as well as exploring practices useful to Chinese ships. In addition, China's lucrative trade process was boosted by a short delivery route. In this case, the China trade plan will see an increase of about 5-15% of China's international trade using the 2020 Arctic delivery route (Kopra, n.d.)

In 2017, China was doing an updated its Belt Road Initiative program for the Arctic region. The silk polar road or polar silk road policy is part of a massive strategy for building BRI in arctic regions by utilizing Arctic Ocean pathways as one of China's 'blue economic pathways' that extend China's economic corridors with north Asia, the Balkans, Russia, Europe and North America (NDRC, 2017). The silk polar road (PSR) vision is a product of globalization to facilitate global trade and economic integration, based on Chinese cooperation with Arctic countries. An example is the Chinese-Russian cooperation on the Yamal project. This northern silk road would enable China to classify its maritime routes while reducing travel time and fuel costs. The opening of Arctic delivery routes was essential for China to boost its economy driven in part by exports. This unopened northern sea route can cut 15 days out of shipping time and allow ships to navigate Russian waters into the western European sea.

In addition, two main routes, northwest passage (NWP) and northeast passage (NEP), provide faster alternatives. This route can be traversed by cutting the Arctic region between NWP and NEP through international waters, although only accessible by the toughest icebreaker. By reducing delivery time, fuel costs and emissions are generally lower (Nakano, 2018).

Through the silk polar road policy China can do some things like; First, China has access to most of the arctic. Second, it facilitated shipping by way of the North Sea Route (NSR), which reduced both time and cost Third, this policy demonstrates

China's ambition to achieve its interests in the Arctic in an indirect way. It is clear that while some components of the Polar Silk Road (PSR) are in operation, others remain firmly within the formulating council. The success and delay of PSR could be determined not only by looking at the finance and logistics of its components but also by major differences in political thinking among potential arctic countries that may or may not have formed building blocks for the northern road or route.

China drafted the PSR regulation well. Through PSR policies, opportunities for cooperation with Arctic countries. The policy was developed with a commitment to instilling a "fair, reasonable, and well-organized system of government" throughout China. Therefore, the BRI unit must be able to support the development of micro, small, and medium-sized businesses. As for precautionary measures, such as coordinating development strategies with arctic countries, encouraging mutual efforts to build the blue economic pathways linking China and Europe through the arctic ocean, increasing arctic digital connectivity, and building global infrastructure networks (Xinhua, 2018)

## CONCLUSION

As part of its BRI initiative, China is positioning the Arctic as an alternative region to meet its energy needs. This is because the arctic is a vast, free region accessible to anyone and any country because it includes the high seas. However, some arctic regions border major power like Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States. This would be a separate barrier to China's participation and activity in the Arctic. Since the 1990s, China has gradually entered the Arctic region and re-entered in 2013 with observer status gained successfully. This was done in order to secure access to the region and exploit it. Through soft, energy-intensive diplomacy, efforts to achieve Arctic energy interests have succeeded with strong cooperation between China and the Arctic nations. Then, with the policies adopted by the arctic council and the region states.

## REFERENCES

- Ademuty, T. N., & Pakpahan, S. (2016). Kepentingan Ekonomi Politik Tiongkok Melakukan Kerjasama Dengan Rusia Di Wilayah Arktik Tahun 2012-2015. *Jurnal Online Mahasiswa (JOM) Bidang Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 3(2), 1–13. <https://jom.unri.ac.id/index.php/JOMFSIP/article/view/10990>
- Alam, K. M., Li, X., & Baig, S. (2019). Impact of transport cost and travel time on trade under China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). *Journal of Advanced Transportation*, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/7178507>
- Alexeeva, O., & Lasserre, F. (2012). The Snow Dragon: China's Strategies in the Arctic. *Http://Journals.Openedition.Org/Chinaperspectives*, 2012(2012/3), 61–68. <https://doi.org/10.4000/CHINAPERSPECTIVES.5958>
- Brady, A.-M. (2017). *China as a Polar Great Power*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316832004>
- Chen, G. (2012). China's emerging Arctic strategy. *Http://Dx.Doi.Org/10.1080/2154896X.2012.735039*, 2(2), 358–371. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2012.735039>
- Chun, Z. (2020). *China's 'Arctic Silk Road' projects | China Dialogue Ocean*. China Dialogue Ocean. <https://chinadialogueocean.net/en/climate/12569-chinas-arctic-silk-road-projects/>
- Gavrilov, V., Kripakova, A., Gavrilov-Professor, V., Law, O., & Alexandra, H. (2017). Arctic policy of the North East Asian countries. *Jindal Global Law Review* 2017 8:1, 8(1), 69–86. <https://doi.org/10.1007/S41020-017-0039-X>
- Graczyk, P., & Koivurova, T. (2014). A new era in the Arctic Council's external relations? Broader consequences of the Nuuk observer rules for Arctic governance. *Polar Record*, 50(3), 225–236. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247412000824>
- Jiang, W. (2005). *Fueling the Dragon: China's Quest for Energy Security and Canada's Opportunities*. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. [https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/cia\\_fueling\\_dragon.pdf](https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/cia_fueling_dragon.pdf)

- Koivurova, T., Kauppila, L., Kopra, S., Lanteigne, M., Shi, M., Smieszek, M., Stepien, A., Käpylä, J., Mikkola, H., Pór Nielsson, E., & Nojonen, M. (2019). *China in the Arctic and the Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese-Finnish Arctic Co-operation*.  
<https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/161371>
- Kopra, S. (n.d.). *China's Arctic Interests*.
- Lai, H. H. (2007). China's oil diplomacy: Is it a global security threat? *Third World Quarterly*, 28(3), 519–537. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701192645>
- Lin, W., Chen, B., Xie, L., & Pan, H. (2015). Estimating energy consumption of transport modes in China using DEA. *Sustainability (Switzerland)*, 7(4), 4225–4239. <https://doi.org/10.3390/SU7044225>
- Liu Qibao. (2013). *Some Points of Understanding concerning the Theoretical Structure of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. « *China Copyright and Media*. China Copyright and Media. <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/07/08/liu-qibao-some-points-of-understanding-concerning-the-theoretical-structure-of-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics/>
- Mazneva, E. (2017). *From Russia With Love: A Super-Chilled Favor for China - Bloomberg*. Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/china-to-get-first-yamal-lng-cargo-as-russia-says-thank-you?leadSource=uverify%20wall>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2019). *China, Finland vow to write new chapter in bilateral ties*. Fmprc. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/gjhdq\\_665435/3265\\_665445/3286\\_664530/3288\\_664534/201901/t20190115\\_574119.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3265_665445/3286_664530/3288_664534/201901/t20190115_574119.html)
- Moe, A. (2017). *China's Exaggerated Arctic Interests - Reconnecting Asia*. Reconnecting Asia. <https://reconasia.csis.org/chinas-exaggerated-arctic-interests/>
- Nakano, J. (2018). *China Launches the Polar Silk Road*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-launches-polar-silk-road>

- Pelaudeix, C. (2018). Along the Road – China in the Arctic. *European Union Institute for Security Studies*. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/along-road-%E2%80%93-china-arctic>
- Pezard, S. (2018). *The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia's and China's Evolving Role in the Region*. [www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT500.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT500.html)
- Pezard, S., Flanagan, S. J., Harold, S. W., Chindea, I. A., Sacks, B. J., Tingstad, A., Finazzo, T., & Kim, S. (2022). China's Strategy and Activities in the Arctic Implications for North American and Transatlantic Security Research Report. In *RAND Corporation*. [www.rand.org/about/principles](http://www.rand.org/about/principles).
- Enright, S. (2016). *One Belt One Road: Insights for Finland | HKTDC Belt and Road Portal*. Tekes.Fi. <https://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/insights/one-belt-one-road-insights-finland-o>
- Steinveg, B. (2020). The role of conferences within Arctic governance. *https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2020.1798540*, 44(1), 37–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2020.1798540>
- The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. (2018). *China's Arctic Policy*. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. [https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white\\_paper/2018/01/26/content\\_281476026660336.htm](https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm)
- Tillman, H., Jian, Y., & Nielsson, E. T. (2018). The Polar Silk Road China's New Frontier of International Cooperation. *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4(3), 345–362. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740018500215>
- Wang, Z. (2013). The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 19, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-013-9272-0>
- Xinhua. (2018). *China publishes Arctic policy, eyeing vision of "Polar Silk Road."* The State Council Information Office the People Republic of China. [http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2018-01/26/content\\_50312513.htm](http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2018-01/26/content_50312513.htm)
- Zou, Y., Wang, Y., Zhang, Y., & Koo, J. H. (2017). Arctic sea ice, Eurasia snow, and extreme winter haze in China. *Science Advances*, 3(3).



## THE REPowerEU: An EU Climate Ambitions and Its Implications On Russian-European Energy Geopolitics Stability

Abd Azis, Tiara Marshanda Andrian, Dinda Nurhaliza Akhrianti

### Abd Azis

Affiliation : Universitas Pertamina  
 City : South Jakarta  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [Abdazis.ir@gmail.com](mailto:Abdazis.ir@gmail.com)

### Tiara Marshanda Andrian

Affiliation : Universitas Pertamina  
 City : South Jakarta  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [marshandatiara@gmail.com](mailto:marshandatiara@gmail.com)

### Dinda Nurhaliza Akhrianti

Affiliation : Universitas Pertamina  
 City : South Jakarta  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [Dindadnao4@gmail.com](mailto:Dindadnao4@gmail.com)

### History

Submission : 6 September 2022  
 Review : 6 November 2022  
 Completed  
 Accepted : 1 December 2022  
 Available : 30 December 2022  
 Online

### DOI :

[10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.151-165](https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.151-165)

### Abstract

As the third largest carbon-emitting country in the world, the European Union has more responsibility to address the problem of preventing climate change. However, the climate management policies implemented by the European Union need to be more effective to achieve the long-term targets in the Paris Agreement. Responding to this, the European Union is planning a new policy, REPowerEU. REPowerEU is a follow-up effort from the European Union towards a clean energy transition and a form of Europe's anger towards Russia's geopolitical energy behaviour. In addition, the REPowerEU Plan is a tool the European Union uses to break away from energy dependence on Russia so that it can be more independent in determining foreign policy. This study aims to assess the impact of the implementation of the European Union's energy policy on Russian-European political stability. This study uses qualitative methods by collecting data through literature studies. This research is analyzed using the neoclassical realism paradigm based on energy geopolitics. It found that there are positive and negative impact in applying REPowerEU to decrease dependency of Russia's energy supply to Europe.

**Key Words:** European Union, Russia, energy transition, REPowerEU, energy geopolitics.

### Cite this article :

Azis, A., Andrian, T. M., & Akhrianti, D. N. (2022). The REPowerEU: An EU Climate Ambitions and Its Implications On Russian-European Energy Geopolitics Stability. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(2), 152–165. <https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.151-165>

## INTRODUCTION

Russia's action to invade Ukraine in February 2022 sparked turmoil in global politics. Russia argued that the agreements and cooperation built with Ukraine are futile because Ukraine changed its foreign policy direction to be pro-Western and pro-EU. It is undeniable that the territory of Ukraine, which lies between the territory of Russia and the European Union, makes Ukraine a geopolitical attribute, a struggle for ideological influence, and a territorial struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs (Bramastya et al., 2022). Ralf Emmers's concept of geopolitics explains that three elements are interrelated in a geopolitical approach, those are the interpretation of the territory, natural resources, and power distribution that can be used to analyze a country's foreign political and military policies. As buffer zone between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance and the Russian Federation, the territory of Ukraine and a wider Eurasia region are important as the geopolitical axis with an abundance of potential resources for Russia's power. However, Ukraine's more pro-Western and European Union position has become a target for NATO to expand its membership in Eastern Europe. NATO considers Ukraine a strategic location to build a military base close to Russia which puts Russia in a threatened position. To get around this, Russia urged Ukraine not to join NATO by carrying out a military attack on Ukraine (Syuryansyah & Berthanila, 2022).

Russia's plan to revive the glory of the "Soviet Union" in the past became the highlighted background for Russia's initiative to re-engage former Soviet Union countries and integrate them under Moscow's control. Russia has firm ambitions to increase its geopolitical power and return to becoming the new "empire" of the eastern bloc. In this case, Ukraine, a former Soviet Union with a strategic closeness with Russia, must accept the geopolitical consequences of being used as a starting point for the mission. Ukraine's position, as strategic value to both Russia and Western European countries, eventually sparked a conflicting interest between them. However, it is giving a bigger impact as other parties such as the United States and wider NATO members also have interests in Ukraine. As consequence, this issue triggered tensions in global political stability (Syuryansyah & Berthanila, 2022).

The recovery of economic stability after World War II and modernization have brought back Russia's glory. This achievement strongly depends on Russia's role as a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas globally. The energy sector has become the main contributor to Russia's foreign revenues to boost the country's economy. Apart from playing an important role in promoting the economy, Russia's energy resources have strategic value in targeting the position of an energy

superpower. In this case, to achieve its interests as an influential regional power, Russia must first increase its influence by maximizing the role of its energy resources. Thus, Ukraine's position is important to distribute the fossils by the Russian pipeline to European Union countries. In the other words, Ukraine has a crucial role as an energy transit area, so its territorial security should be ensured because the distribution cannot be hampered. However, there is a different point of view coming from Ukraine. While on one hand Russia and European countries assumed that Ukraine is stable, the Ukrainian Government feels uncomfortable with the situation, on the other hand. It is because the Ukrainian economy is very dependent on the ups and downs of relations with Russia, resulting in a relationship of imbalance interdependence (Sulastrri, 2013).

Russia indeed uses its natural wealth to become a dominant power in the region. As the natural resource in Russia contains almost 30% of the world's gas and oil reserves (Sulastrri, 2013), the federation planned to increase its security and power to be able to create influential foreign policy. Later, the European Union is expected to rely dependently on Russia's energy market without any significant intervention which affects to the Federation's security and foreign policy. (Bramastya et al., 2022). Thus, it is obvious that energy resources have a decisive role as a tool for achieving Russia's plans. With substantial energy reserves, Russia has the ambition to increase its economy and state security. It also has strong political influence so that it can play in the international energy politics realm in the state's interests to maintain its influence in the region (Sulastrri, 2013).

Apart from the geopolitical map to achieve the foreign policy objectives, Russia's continuous supply of energy resources, especially fossil fuels, contributed to a massive impact on global warming. Global warming will disrupt global security and stability. Parry (2007) stated here must be a global awareness in responding to the impact of global warming as it is disrupting social, economic, and global political stability and, most notably environmental structure. Taking this issue seriously, there is a global movement that aimed to increase awareness in international society. It was a summit that took place in 1972 in Sweden and was the first summit to raise environmental issues. It is the first milestone in global efforts to prevent and plan for the impact of this environmental issue. Decades later, the meeting in Paris in 2015 was attended by 196 countries to produce the Paris Agreement as a common goal in dealing with and solving the threat of global warming and world climate change (Yiwananda & Nugrahani, 2021).

As each society level got impacted by the climate change phenomena, the members of the European Union are also affected. Drought, forest fires, floods, and increasing seawater volume are the negative impacts of global warming that the European

Union (EU) must experience. In responding to this high-risk global threat, the EU became one of the most ambitious parties to prevent climate change by playing an essential role in global climate governance and continuing to push for international commitments. As a form of response, the EU has three strategies to deal with this environmental issue. First, it is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emission levels and increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency. Second, the implementation of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). Third, continuously promoting the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency (European Commission, 2021; Yiwananda & Nugrahani, 2021).

Handling the global climate crisis, of course, requires a firm commitment from all countries and international organizations, so that the global goals that had been set out in the Paris Agreement can be achieved. The EU has so far used climate diplomacy, which consists of two important strategies, those are maintaining world security and stability from the threat of climate change by using diplomatic tools. There are at least four main elements of climate diplomacy in the context of preventing climate crises, which are: 1) commitment to multilateral climate policies, 2) prevention of the impact of climate change on peace and security, 3) real action from each party and increasing global ambitions, and 4) increasing international scale climate cooperation through advocacy (Amul & Shrestha, 2015; Hidayatullah, 2021). In this case, the EU has big responsibilities by taking an important role in handling the global crisis, considering that the EU is ranked as the third largest emitter of carbon in the world (Friedrich, Ge, & Pickens, 2020; Hidayatullah, 2021). Various concrete actions had been taken by the EU to show its ambition and commitment to handling the global climate crisis through the four elements of climate diplomacy. One of the climate diplomacy actions which were implemented by the EU is to support and fund renewable energy projects in order to realize the EU's hard work to carry out the mission of the Paris Agreement (Hidayatullah, 2021). In addition, domestically, the EU implements many energy-related policies, one of which is the EU Regulation 2021/241 regarding energy recovery and security facilities.

However, according to the report, countries around the world, including Europe, are still far way to get deal with global climate problem and are still insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement's long-term goals (UNEP, 2022). Various issues regarding geopolitical and economic dynamics that occurred because of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian-Russian war, had a significant impact on the social and economic stability of the EU countries. This problem encourages the EU to immediately formulate an exit strategy from the clutches of energy dependence from Russia and maximize the transition towards clean energy. It is directly related

to the EU's climate targets in 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050. Continued efforts to increase the real impact of the clean energy transition on the global recovery climate and the EU's response towards Russia's foreign policy behaviour using its energy sources, prompted the European Commission to propose the REPowerEU plan with the primary objective as a tool to overcome the EU's energy dependence on Russia.

### **Literature Review**

Several studies examining the energy trading relationship between Russia and the European Union tend to focus on political and economic dynamics. It remains narrow without analyzing the impact that has occurred on the trade relationship due to the European Union's environmental policies. Therefore, this study focuses on answering the research question of how the impact of REPowerEU on the geopolitical stability of Russia-Europe energy after the EU's decision to reduce its dependency on Russia's fossil energy.

Energy geopolitics is a complex study to understand the direction of a country's energy-related foreign policy. Energy geopolitics discusses the movement of energy for its distribution through tankers, pipelines, and transmission lines that support energy trading. Not only that, but energy geopolitics also discusses the geographical conditions in which energy is produced, purified, stored, and consumed (Hogselius, 2009). Thus, energy infrastructure plays an important role in supporting the internationalization of energy systems, such as oil and gas transport tankers, gas pipelines, and electricity transmission lines. According to Hogselius (2009), in energy geopolitics, there is a phase for the development of the energy system. This phase is marked by material growth as well as the geographical expansion of energy exploration which triggers the integration of long-distance transportation systems for these developments.

In developing the energy system, the government often determines its foreign policy by manipulating the development of the energy system through infrastructure investments such as gas pipelines by utilizing transit countries. The manipulation of the development of the energy system is usually carried out by the intervention of the exporting country's government by encouraging or hindering the development of a project to achieve their interests. Thus, the domestic politics of transit countries will usually be influenced by the foreign policies of energy-exporting countries. The government will usually encourage the development of the energy system if there are benefits to increasing the country's prestige in diplomatic relations with the country concerned. Conversely, the government will reject the development if there is a threatening political risk. Not only threatening exporting

countries, transit, and importing countries also often get threats. Many countries use energy to support territorial disputes or gain political influence in the international system. Therefore, the existence of these considerations will shape the world's energy geography based on the political interests of each party.

In analyzing foreign policy, a paradigm is needed to become the basis of thought in research. The author uses the neoclassical realism paradigm to determine the impact of implementing the European Union's energy and environmental policies on Russia. Neoclassical realism is a refinement of neorealism in analyzing a country's foreign policy. According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy results from the response of domestic factors to external conditions in the international system so that states can still achieve their national interests (Rose, 1998). This paradigm believes that each country has its own foreign policy character. In this case, the “black box” of the domestic factor is important as the intervening variable of an actor to interpret the situation in the international system. In analyzing a foreign policy formulation, there are three variables as a line of thinking from neoclassical realism, namely: (1) systemic stimulus, which is an external factor in the formation of foreign policy; (2) domestic factors, this variable includes the process of forming a policy starting from the perception of policymakers, decision-making process, to implementing decisions; (3) policy response, which is the foreign policy itself (Kusumawardhana, 2021).

## METHOD

In answering the research question, we are using the qualitative method. Based on the explanation of Lamont (2015), the qualitative methods emphasize the analysis strategy that focuses on the phenomena instead of numeric data. At first, we collected data based on secondary sources such as previous journals and studies regarding energy geopolitics in the European region. In this case, we rely on non-numeric data to give a deeper elaboration on the phenomenon that we analyse. We later identify how the REPowerEU was formulated as the internal response to the recent situation of Russia's geopolitical expansion and global pressure to reduce the impacts of climate change. Specifically, we look at the most current data to ensure its relevance to the study.

Furthermore, discourse analysis was also conducted to explain the situation from the collected data. We analyzed any forms of behavior that are represented in the EU policy to interpret how neoclassical realism is suited best to explain the REPower EU. In the end, we come to the conclusion of how REPowerEU is actually a form of foreign policy response from the EU regarding the current situation of the international system.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### **Dependency on Russia and Climate Change: Impacts of the International System**

The European Union imports around 53% of its total energy needs, with around 40% of gas, 27% of oil, and 46% of coal supplies by Russia. This condition makes Russia feel it has a higher capability than the European Union (Saputra, 2014; Hanifah, 2017). Europe's dependence on gas and oil supplies is later being used by Russia to elevate its regional influence. Russia makes it a strength and bargaining position to achieve its national interests of becoming an influential regional power. In this case, Russia might stop energy exports immediately if its national interests were not achieved (Singarimbun, 2022; Angelika, 2019). Russia's behavior then causes concern for consumer countries about their energy security, considering that energy is very crucial for the survival of every country.

Russia and Europe have a relationship of mutual dependence on each other. Russia will suffer losses if energy cooperation with Europe is terminated, considering that Europe is a potential market with more than 70% gas export requirements. However, this dependence creates a dilemma for the EU in deciding security policies and responses regarding Russia's military invasion of Ukraine. There are energy supply threats in European countries if Russia imposes an embargo on the energy supply towards Europe. The difficulty of switching to other energy sources must be faced by consumers in Western European countries if supply stops. Baran (2007) argues that this dependence creates a non-autonomous foreign policy of the EU (Singarimbun, 2022). Energy prices in Europe have quadrupled in the post-Russia-Ukraine war. As a result, Russia's gas supply has decreased from 40% to 15%. Given that the European industry relies heavily on gas as the main energy source, this price increase could impact European countries' economies (IMF, 2022). The annual State of the Energy Union Report shows that soaring European energy prices have led to the EU's dependence on energy imports at its highest level in 30 years. Therefore, the EU must focus on increasing energy security and the transition to clean energy to protect around 31 million EU residents affected by energy poverty (European Commission, 2021).

This condition indeed represents the first international system condition from the perspective of neoclassical realism. It is focusing on the EU's power position while facing Russia. A deep dependency on Russia's energy, at some point, should become a concern for the EU to implement a wise foreign policy that can ensure its energy security without harming its relations with Russia. Russia and Europe are dependent on each other in energy relations. According to the concept of energy

geopolitics, relatively close geographical conditions and the abundance of Russia's energy resources encourage dependence on Eurasia. Russia can take advantage of this to achieve its interests in dominating the Western region. So far, no specific regulation governing complex international gas trade like oil exists. Therefore, trading in gas energy is usually carried out bilaterally with an agreement that the two countries have established. This provides an opportunity for actors to dominate each other to achieve their interests. As a result of the more intimate energy trade ties between Russia and the European Union, when the EU plans to reduce gas imports from Russia, Russia will try to prevent this by using energy as a tool of diplomacy. Russia wants the European Union to continue to depend on Russia in the energy sector. Even Russia does not hesitate to use a military approach to achieve this.

Therefore, the European Union has prepared in anticipation of the threat of an energy crisis that could arise after the conflict so that energy security in its member countries can survive this situation. The EU establishes energy cooperation with oil-producing countries in Central Asia, Norway, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to supply energy in the EU region and increase domestic energy production. The EU is showing high capability with this strategy so that it helps the EU overcome its energy dependence on Russia which is in line with the weakening of the Russian economy, which is dependent on gas exports (European Commission, 2021; Hanifah, 2017).

Secondly, as an energy consumer party, the EU's position at the global level is also crucial. With high-end technology and scientific development, the EU is expected and then claimed itself as the leading actor to combat the impact of climate change. In the end, the energy consumer party will be affected the most when the impacts of climate change cannot be controlled. In this case, the distribution of energy can be disrupted which later hampers the energy security in each state. Therefore, this is the second international system situation that affects how the EU reacted and gave a response through a foreign policy. In short, the EU's position shall also consider the instability that is caused by climate change.

### ***EU's Climate Ambitions: The Domestic Factors***

According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy is considered a way for the state to respond to the international system by considering the domestic dynamics as an element of the decision-making process. This paradigm assumes that foreign policies implemented by a country reflect the country's domestic behaviour. Foreign policy is a response of domestic factors to external conditions in the international system. This is justified by the behaviour of the European Union which creates

various energy policies to respond to environmental issues such as global warming and climate change.

In dealing with the energy crisis as well as the threat of global warming and climate change, the EU has far established several policies such as Directive 2009/28/EC which was adopted in Council Directive 2013/18/EU that contains promotion mechanisms and rules for the use of renewable energy sources (Yiwananda & Nugrahani, 2021). The report from the State of The Energy Union shows that the position of fossil energy as the main energy source in the EU was successfully taken over by renewable energy for the first time in 2020. Currently, it is recorded that 9 EU member states have phased out the use of coal. The progress the EU is making in delivering a clean energy transition is also evident through reduced fossil fuel subsidies due to lower consumption in contrast to renewable energy subsidies and improved energy efficiency in 2020. Further, greater efforts are, of course, still needed to achieve the 2030 goal of reducing carbon gas emissions by at least 55% and achieving climate neutrality by 2050 (European Commission, 2021).

The European Commission proposed the REPowerEU plan to respond to geopolitical tensions due to Russia's attack on Ukraine and the economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic. There are several domestic considerations as the background of the REPowerEU policy formulation. First, REPowerEU was formed to achieve energy transition as a 2030 EU climate target and 2050 climate neutrality. Previously, the European Union had implemented various policies related to energy and environmental security, such as the Third Energy Package in Directive 2009/73/EU and Regulation 715/2009/EU, a revision of the Renewable Energy Directive in Directive 2018/2001/EU, and revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive in Directive 2012/27/EU.

Secondly, in addition to the previous policy, there is a need for a special program to support these policies' implementation with various emerging geopolitical tensions. Therefore, REPowerEU is a solution for the European Union in dealing with this problem. This is in line with the third paragraph of Article 175 of the Agreement on the functions of the European Union which contains that the regulations made by the EU aim to improve relations between member countries through steps that enable member countries to reduce their dependence on fossil energy and improve their energy security. REPowerEU is an idea to achieve energy security through clean energy. Implementing the REPowerEU program, the impact will be significant as it will reduce imports of fossil fuels from Russia, reduce imports of gas from Russia, reduce EU energy consumption, modernization of energy infrastructure, formation of energy market integration of EU member countries, and increase energy security. European Union.

In its application, REPowerEU proposes a series of programs such as saving energy, diversifying the energy supply, replacing fossil fuels with alternative energy, and combining information and energy reform. The EU's energy savings by reducing domestic energy consumption are aimed at reducing its dependence on Russian fossil energy and avoiding a regional energy crisis. Energy diversification is the exploration of various energy variants to support national energy security. In achieving energy diversification, the European Union has established the EU Energy Platform to facilitate the trading of gas, LNG, and hydrogen between member countries by utilizing each country's energy resources. The next program from REPowerEU is to replace fossil fuels and accelerate the energy transition towards clean energy in Europe. In this program, the EU focuses on increasing renewable energy in the power generation, industry, infrastructure, and transportation sectors. Renewable energies with the potential for a clean energy transition for the EU are solar photovoltaics, wind energy, geothermal energy, and solar thermal. To achieve the objectives of each of the programs contained in REPowerEU, proper communication is required for all actors who will be involved. The EU formed the EU Solar Industry Alliance to increase industry contribution to the REPowerEU program. The EU also carries this out as its energy reform in the industrial sector. The EU prioritizes clean energy that is more environmentally friendly as an energy source to run its industry.

### ***REPowerEU: A Foreign Policy to Response Dependency and Climate Change***

REPowerEU in the end is one of the implemented initiatives by the European Union in the energy sector. The EU uses this program to achieve energy security without having to depend on fossil energy resources, most of which are obtained from Russia. The transition to clean energy certainly requires a large amount of funding and a relatively long time. Even so, the transition to clean energy has various positive and negative impacts. The positive impact of this transition is that a country's carbon emissions will be much reduced compared to using fossil energy. That way, the reduced carbon emissions produced will minimize global warming. In addition to the positive impacts, there are also negative impacts that can threaten the implementation of REPowerEU. As the largest energy consumer, this negative impact results from the EU, which stops importing fossil energy. This certainly will have the potential for price fluctuations to an energy crisis that will threaten world political stability.

In addition, with the implementation of REPowerEU, Russia will also lose its energy market target, which will trigger a decline in Russia's foreign revenue. After that

happens, geopolitical conflicts in the Eurasia region will be difficult to avoid. Russia will continue striving to achieve its national interests by not remaining silent about losing the Russian energy market target as its main foreign income. Not only that, the application of REPowerEU can not only threaten the economic and political stability of Europe-Russia but globally will also be affected. Fluctuations in energy prices will disrupt global economic stability and threaten the national security of countries with low energy security. This makes countries must be prepared to face global political tensions.

With the implementation of REPowerEU, geopolitical tensions between Russia and Europe cannot be avoided. The loss of Europe's energy dependence on Russia has fueled Russia's increased aggressiveness. To minimize this, Europe needs to approach and negotiate with Russia that the threat of global warming is a problem that we must prioritize first. It is undeniable that energy issues and global climate issues are both aspects that can disrupt global security. However, at this point, Europe must again prove its commitment as the leader of the global climate recovery movement by promoting the urgency of the climate crisis problem, especially to Russia. This is done so that Russia feels that it has the same urgency to deal with the threat of a global crisis first so that it can slightly reduce its ambition to make energy resources a tool of diplomacy. If the common vision and mission have been achieved, then the potential for the friction of interests between Russia and Europe can be slightly reduced.

## CONCLUSION

REPowerEU is a program proposed by the European Commission to achieve the European Union's energy transition. This program was created to respond to climate change and Russia's attack on Ukraine, which significantly affected the geopolitical stability of Eurasia region. The EU implements REPowerEU by saving energy, diversifying the energy supply, replacing fossil fuels with alternative energy, and combining information and energy reform. the European Union can be released from its dependence on energy supplies from Russia. The implications due to the release of dependence on the European Union as the largest energy importer are divided into positive and negative impacts. The positive impact is that the release of dependence on Russian fossil energy will encourage the European Union to continue developing environmentally friendly alternative energy. On the other hand, the negative impact of REPowerEU is the occurrence of fluctuations in global energy prices, which can threaten world economic and political stability. In addition, the decline in Russia's foreign revenue, which is mostly obtained from energy sales to Europe, will also increase Russia's aggressiveness, thus threatening

world security. To minimize this, the European Union needs to approach bilaterally with Russia through negotiations emphasizing that the threat of global warming is a problem that we must prioritize. That way, Russia will feel that it has the same urgency to deal with the threat of a global crisis so that it can reduce Russia's ambition to make energy resources a tool of diplomacy.

The European Union already has various plans within REPowerEU to realize its energy transition towards clean energy. Even so, many possibilities will occur in global politics after the implementation of REPowerEU, making the EU must be even more prepared to mitigate threats that may come. With this research, it is hoped that subsequent studies will be able to examine how the European Union's policy solutions to the impacts that arise after the implementation of REPowerEU.

## REFERENCES

Amul, G. G., & Shrestha, M. (2015). Cities and Climate Diplomacy. Climate Diplomacy.

- Angelika, Y. (2019). Motif Kerjasama Energi Turki dan Rusia dalam Turkish Stream Pipeline Project. *Jurnal Demokrasi & Otonomi Daerah*, 17 (1), 25-30.
- Baran, Z. (2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30 (4), 131-144.
- Bramastya, R. B., & Puspitarini, R. C. (2022). Geopolitik Ukraina terhadap Rusia dan Uni Eropa. *Sospoli*, 2 (2), 94-102.
- European Commission. (2021). Renewables overtake fossil fuels as the EU's main power source. Retrieved from European Union: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip\\_21\\_5554/IP\\_21\\_5554\\_EN.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_21_5554/IP_21_5554_EN.pdf).
- Friedrich, o., Ge, M., & Pickens, A. (2020). This Interactive Chart Shows Changes in the World's Top 10 Emitters. Retrieved from wri-indonesia.org: <https://wri-indonesia.org/en/blog/interactive-chart-shows-changes-worlds-top-10-emitters>
- Hanifah, U. R. (2017). Embargo Ekonomi sebagai Strategi Konfrontasi Uni Eropa terhadap Rusia pada Masa Konflik Ukraina 2013-2015. *Jurnal Sosial Politik*, 3 (2), 169–195.
- Hidayatullah, M. N. (2021). European Union's Climate Diplomacy: Wasted Money or One Step Forward for the Future? Retrieved from Kontekstual: <https://kontekstual.com/european-unions-climate-diplomacy-wasted-money-or-one-step-forward-for-the-future/>
- Högselius, Per, 2009. "The internationalization of the European electricity industry: The case of Vattenfall," *Utilities Policy*, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 258-266, September.
- IMF. (2022). How A Russias Natural Gas Cutoff Could Weigh on European Economies. Retrieved from The International Monetary Fund: <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/07/19/blog-how-a-russias-natural-gas-cutoff-could-weigh-on-european-economies>
- Kusumawardhana, I. (2021). *Pengantar Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri*. Yogyakarta: CV Pustaka Ilmu Group.
- Parry, E. J. (2007). The Greatest Threat To Global Security: Climate Change Is Not Merely An Environmental Problem. Retrieved from United Nations:

<https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/greatest-threat-global-security-climate-change-not-merely-environmental-problem>

- Rose, G. (1998). Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. *World Politics*, 51 (1), 144-172.
- Singarimbun, L. A. (2022). Dependensi Energi Uni Eropa-Rusia di Tengah Pusaran Konflik Rusia-Ukraina. Retrieved from Pusat Studi Perdagangan Dunia UGM: <https://cwts.ugm.ac.id/2022/03/20/dependensi-energi-uni-eropa-rusia-di-tengah-pusaran-konflik-rusia-ukraina/>
- Sulastri, A. (2013). Politik Energi Rusia dan Dampaknya terhadap Eropa terkait Sengketa Gas Rusia-Ukraina 2006-2009. *Jurnal Analisis Hubungan Internasional*, 2 (3), 33-57.
- Syuryansyah, S., & Berthanila, R. (2022). Upaya Penyelesaian Konflik Rusia-Ukraina. *Jurnal Power in International Relation*, 7 (1), 97-105.
- UNEP. (2022). Emissions Gap Report 2022. Retrieved from UN Environment Programme: <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2022>
- Yiwananda, Y., & Nugrahani, H. S. (2021). Realisasi Kebijakan Energi Terbarukan Uni Eropa (UE) oleh Denmark dalam Upaya Menghadapi Ancaman Pemanasan Global. *Intermestic: Journal of International Studies*, 6 (1), 121-146.



# The Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) In The Practice of Using Nuclear Energy For Peaceful Purposes In Indonesia

Tanti Aulia Syafitri Lubis

## Tanti Aulia Syafitri Lubis

Affiliation : Universitas Pertamina  
 City : South Jakarta  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [tantiaslofc@gmail.com](mailto:tantiaslofc@gmail.com)

## History

Submission : 8 August 2022  
 Review : 6 November 2022  
 Completed  
 Accepted : 1 December 2022  
 Available : 30 December 2022  
 Online

## DOI :

10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.166-179

## Abstract

Nuclear energy is the last alternative energy to be used on a large scale since the creation of the first nuclear fission since the end of world war II. In addition to its widely used to mitigate climate change and sustainable environmental goals, nuclear energy is also for some views considered as a symbol of a major country. To ensure its use for peaceful purposes, in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established, which consists of many countries in the world including Indonesia. Therefore, this article seeks to determine the IAEA's role as an international organization in the practice of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia. To examine this topic, the researcher used the International Organization in International Relations as a theoretical framework. The data and information used in this research were obtained through library research. This article found that, as an international organization, the IAEA serves as a consulting body as well as a supervisor in the practice of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia, one of which can be seen through the CPF (Country Programme Framework) document between the IAEA-Indonesia which has been signed 5 (five) times.

**Key Words:** IAEA, Nuclear Energy, Indonesia, Internasional Organization, Country Programme Framework

## Cite this article :

Lubis, T. A. S. (2022). The Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) In The Practice of Using Nuclear Energy For Peaceful Purposes In Indonesia. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(2), 166–179.  
<https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.166-179>

## INTRODUCTION

The discovery and exploitation of new sources of energy has been central to human progress from the early struggle for biological survival to today's technological world. The first step was learning to control fire, with wood or other biomass as the fuel. This was followed by the harnessing of wind for ships and windmills, the use of water power from rivers, and—mostly much later—the exploitation of chemical energy from the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas. Nuclear energy, which first emerged in the middle of the 20th century, is the latest energy source to be used on a large scale (Bodansky, 2004).

After World War II ended in 1945, scientists and engineers began work to make nuclear fission an abundant and inexpensive source of energy (though others went on to make nuclear weapons even scarier). All fission reactors work on the same basic principle, although they use different types of fuel, different ways of controlling reactions, and different ways of converting reactor heat into electricity (Cooper). For information, to be able to produce nuclear energy, it is necessary to nuclear reactors. A nuclear reactor is a device or installation run on nuclear fuel that can produce a controlled chain core reaction used for power generation, or research, and/or radioisotope production (Koesrianti, 2016).

In fact, renewed interest in nuclear energy arises from the desire to find alternatives to expensive oil and natural gas as well as the perception of nuclear energy as a readily deployable option for making the rapid and dramatic reductions in carbon dioxide emissions necessary to mitigate climate change. Energy security and climate change are invariably mentioned as the top two reasons for pursuing nuclear energy today (Squassoni, 2009). Also, Nuclear energy is often regarded by countries as a symbol of great prowess, rather than simply as a way to produce electricity (Squassoni, 2009).

The rapid advancement of technology and technological science as it is today, making the use of nuclear energy as a response to human energy needs are widely done by countries in the world. In order to ensure its use in peaceful purposes, in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field. It works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (IAEA, 2016). As of 7 April 2021, the IAEA already has 173 member states out of a total of states in the world. This includes Indonesia, which joined since the early formation of the IAEA in 1957 along with 55 other countries (IAEA, 2016).

For Indonesia, the increasing use of conventional energy resources will certainly face the problem of increasingly limited conventional energy resources in Indonesia as well as the environmental impacts caused. Meanwhile, energy imports will threaten Indonesia's future energy resilience and sovereignty. Thus the use of nuclear energy technology is an important and urgent alternative to the fulfillment of Indonesia's future energy needs (Harto & Rosita, 2014). Nuclear energy technology is able to meet energy needs massively and continuously. This is perfect for improving Indonesia's industrialization capabilities in the future. Thus, to meet the massive and continuous energy needs, there is no other option to replace the role of the use of conventional energy resources except the use of nuclear energy (Harto & Rosita, 2014). Therefore, this research seeks to provide an understanding of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Practice of Using Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes in Indonesia.

### **Literature Review**

As a supporting material for research, this research conducted literature studies on a number of previous studies and other literature related to the role of the IAEA in the practice of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia. Koesrianti (2016) in a book entitled *Dua Sisi Nuklir: Senjata Nuklir dan Kesejahteraan Manusia* stated that the use of nuclear since the beginning of its discovery can be seen through two sides, namely for human welfare and on the other hand misused by the state as a nuclear weapon that can be an instrument of threat to other countries. In general, the writing by Koesrianti (2016) contains an understanding of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the role and function of the IAEA, the role and function of the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), the role of the IAEA in "Atom for Food", the misuse of nuclear energy by the state, to accountability, the regulation of international law, and the validity of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and the resulting losses. The writing by Koesrianti (2016) is important for researcher in understanding the use of nuclear energy on two sides and its position on the international level. In contrast to the writings by Koesrianti (2016), this research will focus on the IAEA's role in the practice of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia.

Pratiwi (2013) in a journal article entitled *Peran IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) dalam Menyikapi Tindakan Korea Utara dalam Pengembangan Tenaga Nuklir untuk Tujuan Tidak Damai* stated that in the case of nuclear use in North Korea, The IAEA has performed its role as an international nuclear agency by conducting direct monitoring of nuclear development originally intended for North Korean power plants up to imposes sanctions on nuclear weapons tests that violate its use for peaceful purposes as intended and violate the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty. This resulted in North Korea's withdrawal from the IAEA, as well as from the IAEA Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The journal article by Pratiwi (2013) is important for researcher in understanding the IAEA's role in overseeing the use of nuclear energy in its member states for peaceful purposes and fully compliant with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that has been enacted and ratified by the relevant country. In this case, North Korea violated it. In contrast to the journal article by Pratiwi (2013), this research will focus on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia which is inseparable from the iaea's role as an international nuclear organization, not only in supervising but also in providing support in the form of nuclear science and technology.

Amijaya (2018) in a journal article entitled *Peranan International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) melalui The International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima dalam Penanganan Kerusakan Reaktor Nuklir di Jepang Pasca Tsunami 11 Maret 2011* stated that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes one of which can be used as a nuclear power plant (PLTN). The development of nuclear power plant is faced with trauma after the nuclear disaster that hit Japan in 2011. In response to the disaster, the IAEA played a role in handling and monitoring further damage to nuclear reactors in Japan by conducting detailed investigations to minimize radiological and other damage that could be caused by the disaster, and also being an international nuclear forum specifically intended as a meeting of the world's countries to discuss the nuclear disaster in Japan, its impact, and the strategy of procurement of established nuclear power plants in the future to prevent the same happening over again. This research being important for researcher in understanding the IAEA's role as an international nuclear organization focused on the use of nuclear for peaceful purposes, urging that the procurement of nuclear facilities in all countries of the world be reviewed in order to conform to the latest aspects of nuclear power and minimal risk. This is according to the researcher by remembering that the procurement of well-established nuclear facilities and guaranteed minimal risk is a necessity by each relevant country while adjusting to potential future threats. Because, Japan itself as a technologically well-established country, remains not guaranteed to avoid the risk of nuclear disaster. The journal article by Amijaya (2018) is important for researcher in understanding the importance of procurement of domestic nuclear facilities that are minimally risky in all aspects. In contrast to Amijaya's (2018) journal article, this research will focus on the IAEA's role in the practice of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia.

## **METHOD & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This research employs library research by seeking relevant literature in International Relations about international organisations and nuclear issues. Data are obtained from open-source journals that can be accessed and from relevant Indonesian government policies related to this research topic.

### **International Organization**

Archer (2001) defined international organization as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or nongovernmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership (Archer, 2001). Furthermore, Archer (2001) stated that the role of international organizations can be identified by 3 (three) main roles, namely (Archer, 2001): (1) as an instrument, which its member states use to achieve certain objectives and notwithstanding the national interests of member states; (2) as an arena, in which case international organizations provide a meeting place for members to unite to discuss, debate, cooperate or disagree. Arenas are neutral, can be used for play, circus or fight; and (3) as an independent actor in international relations (Archer, 2001).

Meanwhile, its function, Archer (2001) stated that international organizations function in (Archer, 2001): (1) performing the task of articulation of interests and aggregation in international affairs; (2) contributed substantially as instruments, forums, and actors to the normative activities of the international political system; (3) recruitment of participants in the international political system; (4) socialization aimed at instilling an individual's loyalty to the system in which he or she resides and to obtain acceptance of the prevailing values of that system and its institutions; (5) rule making; (6) rule application; (7) rule adjudication, as the adjudication of regulations in the country is carried out by the judiciary - court of law, arbitration panel, court and so on, in the international level of regulatory adjudication process one of which is carried out by the International Court of Justice (ICJ); (8) conduct certain activities in the international political system that are useful but not directly involved in the conversion function of the system or in its maintenance and adaptation. They are invaluable in communication and information; (9) perform a number of operational functions in the specifications of each field (Archer, 2001).

As an international organizations, the IAEA is a formal and continuous international organization, consisting of 173 countries in the world as of April 2021,

and was formed with the aim of achieving common interests regarding the use of nuclear for peaceful purposes within the country of each member state. Based on its role, the IAEA is an instrument as well as an arena for each member state with its own national interests to jointly discuss and to decide an agreement on achieving common goals in terms of safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy within the country in addition to carrying out its functions in the international political system regarding the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

## DISCUSSION

Indonesia is one of the largest archipelagos in the world that has 17,508 islands, situated between 6 degrees northern latitude and 11 degrees southern latitude and spreading from 97 degrees to 141 degrees eastern longitude and it is located between two continents – Asia and Australia/Oceania. This strategic position greatly influences the country's culture, social, politics and economy (IAEA, 2014). As to other countries, for Indonesia, energy has an important and strategic role in the achievement of social, economic and Environmental goal in the national sustainable development. Energy Demand is projected to continually increasing as a result of the economic growth and the increase of population. Therefore, Energy Management has to be well-implemented in order to meet the energy supply assurance both for the present and future needs (The President of The Republic of Indonesia, 2014).

In October 2014, the Government of Indonesia enacted Government Regulation No. 79 of 2014 in regard to the National Energy Policy (NEP). NEP is a comprehensive policy which covers both the supply and the demand sides. It serves as the main guideline in national energy management to achieve the security of domestic energy supply (IAEA, 2017). Through this policy, Indonesia targets to reduce dependence on gasoline and increase the use of renewable energy. This includes national energy policy targets with clear targets for the share of each type of primary energy in achieving an optimal primary energy mix from 2025 to 2050.

As stated in The Government Regulation of The Republic of Indonesia No. 79 of 2014 on National Energy Policy (NEP), As stated in the government regulation of the republic of Indonesia nO 79 of 2014 on National energy policy, optimal Primary Energy mix shall be achieved (The President of The Republic of Indonesia, 2014): (1) the role of the New Energy and Renewable Energy at least 23% (twenty three percent) in 2025 and to be at least 31% (thirty one percent) in 2050 provided that its economical fulfilled; (2) the role of oil shall be less than 25% (twenty five percent) in 2025 and to be less than 20% (twenty percent) in 2050; (3) the role of coal at least 30% (thirty percent) in 2025, and 25% (twenty five percent) at the minimum

in 2050; and (4) the role of natural gas at least 22% (twenty two percent) in 2025 and at least 24% (twenty four percent) in 2050 (The President of The Republic of Indonesia, 2014) (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Energy Mix Target

Source: (IAEA, 2017)

In NEP 2014, nuclear energy is categorized into a new energy group, i.e. energy derived from new technologies. Because utilization of nuclear energy requires high safety and security standards and also considering the impact of nuclear radiation hazards on the environment, nuclear energy utilization is regarded as the last option. However, in-depth studies which have been conducted regarding the technological development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, fulfilling the needs of the growing energy demand by supplying national energy on a large scale, reducing carbon emissions and the urgent national interest suggest that nuclear energy can be utilized (IAEA, 2017).

In order to ensure the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, in 1957 was established the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field (IAEA, 2016). The establishment was also intended as a response to the deep fears and expectations generated by the discoveries and diverse uses of nuclear technology. The Agency's genesis was U.S. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953 (IAEA, 2016). The IAEA is strongly linked to nuclear technology and its controversial applications, either as a weapon or as a practical and useful tool. The ideas President Eisenhower expressed in his speech in 1953 helped shape the IAEA's [Statute](#), which 81 nations unanimously approved in October 1956 (IAEA, 2016).

The Agency was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate to work with

its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The objectives of the IAEA's dual mission – to promote and control the Atom – are defined in Article II of the IAEA Statute (IAEA, 2016):

*“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.”* (IAEA, 2016)

The role and function of the IAEA is as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology around the world. With the aim to realize international peace and security and to realize the World's Millennium Goals in the social, economic, and environmental quality improvement (Koesrianti, 2016). The use of nuclear for peaceful purposes itself refers to international nuclear treaties that have been ratified by many countries in the world, such as the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other additional related protocols.

There are 3 (three) pillars set out in the IAEA Statute, namely (Koesrianti, 2016): (1) Safety and Security; (2) Science and Technology; and (3) Safeguards and Verifications (Koesrianti, 2016). In achieving these three pillars, the IAEA has three main missions or functions, namely (Koesrianti, 2016): (1) Inspection of member state nuclear energy facilities that are manifestly used for peaceful purposes; (2) Establish certain provisions and standards to ensure that all member states' nuclear energy facilities are stable; and (3) Serves as a network center for scientists in finding and implementing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Koesrianti, 2016).

In fact, Indonesia has been a member of the IAEA since 1957 and has played an active role in global efforts to develop and utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. During this membership period, Indonesia has signed five CPF documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2020). The CPF document is a medium-term strategic plan that will serve as a reference in the implementation of technical cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2020). A Country Programme Framework (CPF), prepared by a Member State in collaboration with the Secretariat, defines mutually agreed priority development needs and interests to be supported through technical cooperation activities. A CPF reflects national development plans and priorities, country specific analyses and

lessons learned from past cooperation, and also takes into consideration the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) of the country and the Sustainable Development Goals, as appropriate. This ensures that the application of nuclear technologies is integrated with existing development initiatives and plans, and supports the identification of areas where such technologies might be usefully deployed. A CPF generally covers a period of four to six years (IAEA, 2016).

Reported through IAEA (2016), CPFs are characterized by (IAEA, 2016): (1) A close dialogue between Member States and the IAEA as partners, ensuring greater ownership of the programme; (2) The linking of the project selection process to well defined national development objectives and priorities to ensure the relevance of IAEA's support and the sustainability and impact of technical cooperation activities; (3) Great emphasis on national competencies and capabilities in order to optimize the role and participation of Member States in the programme; (4) Opportunities to contribute to the global development agenda and build partnerships between the IAEA, national and regional institutions, the UN and other international organizations (IAEA, 2016).

The IAEA is in this case a consulting body as well as a supervisor in the practice of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia. This role can be seen through the extension of the CPF document between the IAEA and Indonesia which signifies the succession of the IAEA's role domestically and Indonesia's commitment to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The CPF document extension was conducted for the period 2021-2025 on 23 September 2020 at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2020). This CPF document for 2021-2025 covers six areas of cooperation: radiation safety and security, food and agriculture, health and nutrition, water resources and the environment, energy and industry, and capacity building. The CPF refers to national development programs and priorities, and accommodates elements in the Sustainable Development Goals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2020).

The cooperation on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes between Indonesia and the IAEA has provided real benefits for Indonesia, including the use of radiation mutation technology for the breeding of food plant varieties (rice, soybeans, green beans, sorghum, peanuts and bananas) which have a positive impact on increasing income of user farmers, diagnosing and treating diseases using radiation technology, and the use of irradiation technology by the national industrial sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, 2020). Through technical cooperation with the IAEA, Indonesia has also succeeded in increasing the capacity of its human resources and research facilities so that it

becomes the IAEA's collaborating centre for food and non-destructive testing, as well as playing an active role in providing assistance to other member countries to increase capacity and technological mastery (BATAN, 2020).

Indonesia itself is a country that has a greater depth of experience and infrastructure in nuclear technology than any other country in southeast Asia (World Nuclear Association, 2021). Small-scale nuclear projections for example, In April 2016 BATAN's website showed that it was planning to build a test and demonstration high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTR) of 10 MWt as a RDE. The IAEA has supported this through a technical cooperation project focused both on design review with BATAN and on licensing with BAPETEN (World Nuclear Association, 2021). Earlier in November 2009 the IAEA undertook an integrated nuclear infrastructure review (INIR) mission to Indonesia. Against 19 parameters, "no actions needed" on six, "significant actions needed" on three, and the rest "minor actions needed". In respect to IAEA milestones, the country is at the first: "ready to make a knowledgeable commitment" (World Nuclear Association, 2021). For information, the practice of using nuclear energy within the country must conform to the standardization set by the IAEA.

Furthermore, in the practice of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia, together with the IAEA, external monitoring of radiation safety implementation is carried out by the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) (Kepala BATAN, 2007). Another peaceful use of nuclear practice in conjunction with the IAEA is the use of nuclear to measure and analyze airborne pollutants. Together with the IAEA as an international nuclear organization, this use has succeeded in making the City of Bandung, Indonesia achieve the title of *ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable City* in 2017 (IAEA, 2018). Even in terms of health, research and supervision in its use in Indonesia is inseparable from the role of the IAEA. One of them is related to the prevention of excess radiation that can cause cancer.

Actually, the IAEA's support is not focused on delivering nuclear power equipment, but rather on the transfer of knowledge and expertise. High-quality technical training helps countries to build on the country's own expertise so that it can train future generations of nuclear specialists (IAEA, 2018). This is by remembering nuclear science and technology help countries to reduce poverty and hunger, generate electricity, manage water resources, treat diseases such as cancer and respond to climate change – and much more (IAEA, 2018).

## CONCLUSION

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia is inseparable from the iaea's role as an international organization specifically engaged in nuclear science and technology. Also with Indonesia's ratification of a number of international nuclear treaties such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, iaea safeguards agreement, and other additional nuclear-related protocols. The use of nuclear for peaceful purposes itself can be interpreted as the use intended to achieve prosperity, not for weaponry. In this regard, the IAEA serves as a consultant and supervisor who provides training support, transfer of science and technology, and supervision over the use of nuclear energy within the country such as for environmental, food, health, and other aspects of national development in order to comply with the iaea's established standards. This role is in line with the iaea's three main pillars contained in the IAEA statutes relating to safety and security, science and technology, and safeguarding and verification. Indonesia's cooperation framework with the IAEA itself has been established since Indonesia's membership in the IAEA in 1957, one of which can be seen through the CPF document which is a reference in the technical cooperation practice of the use of nuclear technology in Indonesia with the IAEA for peaceful purposes. Most recently, CPF was agreed between IAEA-Indonesia in September 2020 for the period 2021-2025.

## REFERENCES

- Adiwardoyo, Lasman, A. N., Ruslan, Parmanto, E. M., & Effendi, E. (2010). *Mengenal Reaktor Nuklir dan Manfaatnya*. Jakarta: PDIN - BATAN.
- Alatas, Z., Hidayati, S., Akhadi, M., Purba, M., Purwadi, D., Ariyanto, S., et al. (n.d.). *Buku Pintar Nuklir*. Retrieved Mei 25, 2021, from BATAN: [http://drive.batan.go.id/kip/documents/12buku\\_pintar.pdf](http://drive.batan.go.id/kip/documents/12buku_pintar.pdf)
- Amijaya, C. (2018). Peranan International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Melalui The International Fact Finding Expert Mission of The Fukushima dalam Penanganan Kerusakan Reaktor Nuklir di Jepang Pasca Tsunami 11 Maret 2011. *Global Political Studies Journal Vol.2 No.2*, 145-160.
- Archer, C. (2001). *International Organizations Third Edition*. Routledge.
- BATAN. (2020, September 24). *Indonesia – IAEA Tanda Tangani Kerangka Kerjasama Teknis Pemanfaatan Teknologi Nuklir*. Retrieved Juni 1, 2021, from Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional: <http://www.batan.go.id/index.php/id/kedeputian/manajemen/hhk/6768-indonesia-iaea-tanda-tangani-kerangka-kerjasama-teknis-pemanfaatan-teknologi-nuklir>
- Bodansky, D. (2004). *Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects 2nd ed.* New York: Springer.
- Cooper, C. (n.d.). *Nuklir, Manfaat, dan Permasalahannya*. (Rudiyanto, Terjemahan). Bandung: PT Pakar Raya.
- Harto, A. W., & Rosita, W. (2014). *Peran Energi Nuklir dalam Pemenuhan Kebutuhan Energi Indonesia pada Masa Depan*. BUKU PUTIH ENERGI NASIONAL. (In Press).
- IAEA. (2014). *Indonesia*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from Country Nuclear Power Profiles - 2014 Edition: [https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2014\\_CD/countryprofiles/Indonesia/Indonesia.htm](https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/CNPP2014_CD/countryprofiles/Indonesia/Indonesia.htm)
- IAEA. (2016, Februari 9). *Country Programme Frameworks*. Retrieved Juni 1, 2021, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/services/technical-cooperation-programme/country-programme-frameworks>
- IAEA. (2016, Juni 8). *History*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history>

- IAEA. (2016, Juni 8). *List of Member States*. Retrieved Mei 26, 2021, from IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/about/governance/list-of-member-states>
- IAEA. (2016, Juni 8). *Overview*. Retrieved Mei 26, 2021, from IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview>
- IAEA. (2016, Juni 8). *The Statute of the IAEA*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-2>
- IAEA. (2017). *INDONESIA*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from Country Nuclear Power Profiles - 2017 Edition: <https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/cnpp2017/countryprofiles/Indonesia/Indonesia.htm>
- IAEA. (2018, Februari 5). *Nuclear Technology for Sustainable Development*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/nuclear-technology-for-sustainable-development-5-february-2018>
- IAEA. (2020, September 23). *Indonesia Signs its Fifth Country Programme Framework (CPF) for 2021-2025*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/indonesia-signs-its-fifth-country-programme-framework-cpf-for-2021-2025>
- Kemlu RI. (2019, November 22). *Indonesia Sampaikan Perspektif Penggunaan Teknologi Nuklir untuk Tujuan Damai sebagai Isu Pemersatu Negara Pihak Traktat Nonproliferasi Nuklir (NPT) dalam Seminar Tematik Pilar III NPT*. Retrieved Mei 30, 2021, from Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia di Wina, Republik Austria: <https://kemlu.go.id/vienna/id/news/3426/indonesia-sampaikan-perspektif-penggunaan-teknologi-nuklir-untuk-tujuan-damai-sebagai-isu-pemersatu-negara-pihak-traktat-nonproliferasi-nuklir-npt-dalam-seminar-tematik-pilar-iii-npt>
- Kemlu RI. (2020, Februari 10). *Keamanan nuklir harus komprehensif dan tidak boleh menghambat hak negara memanfaatkan teknologi nuklir untuk tujuan damai*. Retrieved Mei 30, 2021, from Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia di Wina, Republik Austria: <https://kemlu.go.id/vienna/id/news/5422/keamanan-nuklir-harus-komprehensif-dan-tidak-boleh-menghambat-hak-negara-memanfaatkan-teknologi-nuklir-untuk-tujuan-damai>
- Kepala BATAN. (2007). *Peraturan Kepala Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional Nomor: 101/KA/VI/2007 Tentang Pedoman Manajemen Penelitian*,

- Pengembangan, Perencanaan, dan Diseminasi Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi Nuklir*. Jakarta: Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional.
- Khairunnisa, N. F. (2017). *Perkembangan Pengaturan Teknologi Nuklir sebagai Energi untuk Pembangunan Berkelanjutan*. Makassar: Universitas Hasanuddin.
- Koesrianti. (2016). *Dua Sisi Nuklir: Senjata Nuklir dan Kesejahteraan Manusia*. Sidoarjo: Zifatama Publisher.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia. (2020, September 24). *Indonesia-IAEA Sign Cooperation in Nuclear Application Engineering*. Retrieved May 31, 2021, from Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia, in Vienna, The Republic of Austria: <https://kemlu.go.id/vienna/en/news/8562/indonesia-iaea-tandatangani-kerjasama-teknik-aplikasi-nuklir>
- Pratiwi, A. Y. (2013). Peran IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) dalam Menyikapi Tindakan Korea Utara dalam Pengembangan Tenaga Nuklir untuk Tujuan Tidak Damai. *Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa Universitas Surabaya Vol.2 No.2*, 1-15.
- Squassoni, S. (2009). *Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation?* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- The President of The Republic of Indonesia. (2014). *Government Regulation of The Republic of Indonesia Number 79 of 2014 on National Energy Policy*. Jakarta: The Republic of Indonesia.
- WNN. (2018, Feburari 6). *Indonesia and IAEA strengthen cooperation*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from world nuclear news: <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Indonesia-and-IAEA-strengthen-cooperation-0602185.html>
- World Nuclear Association. (2021, Januari). *Nuclear Power in Indonesia*. Retrieved Mei 31, 2021, from World Nuclear Association: <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/indonesia.aspx>



## Securitisation of Identity Issues In the Nagorno-Karabakh War in Azerbaijan, 2020

Adib Irsadi, Ori Fahriansyah, Herri Junius Nge

### Adib Irsadi

Affiliation : Universitas Tanjungpura  
 City : Pontianak  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [adibirsadi@gmail.com](mailto:adibirsadi@gmail.com)

### Ori Fahriansyah

Affiliation : Universitas Tanjungpura  
 City : Pontianak  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [orifahryuntan@gmail.com](mailto:orifahryuntan@gmail.com)

### Herri Junius Nge

Affiliation : Universitas Tanjungpura  
 City : Pontianak  
 Country : Indonesia  
 Email : [orifahryuntan@gmail.com](mailto:orifahryuntan@gmail.com)

### History

Submission : 8 August 2022  
 Review : 6 November 2022  
 Completed  
 Accepted : 1 December 2022  
 Available : 30 December 2022  
 Online

### DOI :

[10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.180-197](https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.180-197)

### Abstract

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has persisted for over a century, primarily revolving around cultural issues and territorial disputes, particularly concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war (1994), the two countries have been in conflict at least seven times, varying in intensity. The conflicts in 1994 and 2020 were the two largest in the history of both countries. This research is a descriptive study with a qualitative approach, aiming to explain the securitization process undertaken by Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The study employs the Copenhagen School's securitization theory based on Barry Buzan's "Security: A New Framework for Analysis". The research concludes that the modern Azerbaijan identity is significantly influenced by the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and anti-Armenian sentiments. These sentiments facilitate the Azerbaijani government in securitizing Nagorno-Karabakh issue as an existential threat to the identity of Azerbaijan. The securitization process by the Azerbaijani government involves the education system and mass media in shaping national identity.

**Key Words:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Securitization, Sentiment

### Cite this article :

Irsadi, A., Fahriansyah, O., & Junius Nge, H. (2022). Securitisation of Identity Issues In the Nagorno-Karabakh War in Azerbaijan, 2020. *Journal of International Studies on Energy Affairs*, 3(2), 180–197.  
<https://doi.org/10.51413/jisea.Vol3.Iss2.2022.180-197>

## INTRODUCTION

The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 was a war rooted in territorial dispute between two Caucasus nations, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The dispute began in 1991 when the Armenian ethnic majority of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to separate themselves from Azerbaijan and declare independence as Republic of Artsakh with the support of Armenia. The support however made identity issues a highly sensitive topic when addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, extending the issue beyond territorial dispute.

The Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 lasted for 44 days, starting on September 27 and ending on November 10, 2020. 30 percent of Nagorno-Karabakh's population was displaced as the result of the war leaving the land unsafe for Karabakh Armenians (Group, 2021). It is important to highlight that although the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 was short and devastating, it is not unpredictable. The war occurred as a result of the ineffective peacebuilding and mediation efforts following the first Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1994 (Smolnik et al., 2021, p. 3)

The first Nagorno-Karabakh war occurred between 1988 and 1994. The war took place during the early years of Armenia and Azerbaijan's independence from the Soviet Union. The outbreak of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War was triggered by demonstrations in Nagorno-Karabakh led by Armenian nationalist groups demanding the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia in 1988. Although the Soviet Union rejected these demands, Soviet Armenia supported Nagorno-Karabakh's claims, which ultimately prompted a military response from Azerbaijan (Aslanli, 2022, pp. 151–154)

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended on May 12, 1994, with the signing of the Bishkek ceasefire agreement, brokered by the OSCE Minsk Group, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. The ceasefire required external parties to play an active role in maintaining peace, involving peacekeeping forces from Russia, Turkey, and the United States. Azerbaijan suffered a devastating defeat in the First Nagorno-Karabakh war, losing seven regions, including Nagorno-Karabakh, to Armenian control. The Azerbaijan sources reported that Armenian occupation resulted in the deaths of 30,000 people and the ethnic cleansing of 700,000 Azeris during Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories (Hakan Yavuz & Gunter, 2023, hlm. 67).

Azerbaijan's defeat in the First Nagorno-Karabakh war fueled a rapid growth of anti-Armenian sentiments among its population. According to the fifth report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on Azerbaijan, discrimination against the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan is deeply rooted in the government and education systems where they closely tied the sentiments to the

Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Azerbaijani politicians frequently reflected this discrimination in their speeches, and it was further promoted through the Azerbaijani education system (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2023, pp. 10–16). With a society already harboring intense anti-Armenian sentiments, the securitization of identity issues and the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute became highly politicized in Azerbaijan. As the government systematically normalized the anti-Armenian sentiment, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war eventually seemed inevitable.

After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan were limited to sporadic armed clashes from 1994 to 2020. At least five clashes and ceasefire violations occurred during this period: The First Clash (2008): Took place in Levonarkh, Martakert Province, Nagorno-Karabakh, triggered by unrest following Armenia's 2008 elections in Yerevan. The clash resulted in two Azeri deaths and one Armenian injury (BBC News, 2008). The Second Clash (2010): Occurred in September 2010, with a clash happening in the village of Chaylu saw both sides accusing each other of provocation. Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense reported casualties of three Armenian and two Azerbaijani personnel (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2010). The Third Clash (2012): Took place in June 4, 2012, where a clash occurred along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in Tavush Province, Armenia, and Qazax, Azerbaijan (Wolfinbarger, 2015, pp. 2–3). The Fourth Clash (2014): The clash was different in comparison to the previous clashes. Whereas the previous clashes are short and highly intense, the clash of 2014 was a year-long, low-intensity conflict that claimed around 100 lives on both sides (Sanamyan, 2016). The Fifth Clash (2016): Known as the "Four-Day War" or "April War," that occurred in April 2016 in Talish and Madagis, Tartar District, Azerbaijan. It ended on April 5, 2016, with a new ceasefire. Azerbaijan secured 8 kilometers of Nagorno-Karabakh territory, including the village of Talish. The operation was done to test Azerbaijan's newly modernized military equipment that was supported by Israel and Turkey (Erickson, 2022, pp. 224–225). Between 2016 and 2020, although the tensions between two countries remained high, no significant clashes occurred until July 2020 with a confrontation in Tavush Province, Armenia. The confrontation resulted in numerous casualties, including a National Hero of Azerbaijan, Major General Polad Hashimov who took part in the First Nagorno Karabakh war and the Four-Day War of. The death of the war hero enraged the Azerbaijani public and eventually contributed in escalating the tensions into a full-scale war in September 2020 (Erickson, 2022, pp. 233–234; Hakan Yavuz & Gunter, 2023, p. 160).

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began on September 27, 2020, with Azerbaijan launching military operations targeting strategic cities in Nagorno-Karabakh, including Stepanakert, Shusha, Jabrayil, and Zangilan. By October 2020,

Azerbaijan gained the upper hand, capturing Jabrayil and surrounding areas on October 10. Armenian forces gradually retreated to Hadrut, Fuzuli, and eventually Shusha. On November 8, Azerbaijan seized Shusha, a strategic location in Nagorno-Karabakh, effectively gaining control of most of the region.

The war ended on November 10, 2020, with a ceasefire agreement mediated by Russia (Erickson, 2022, pp. 236–239). Under the agreement, Russia would oversee the ceasefire for five years, during which both sides would de-escalate, and Armenian forces would withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh (Kremlin, 2020).

## Literature Review

Securitization theory defines "security" as a process of politicization that transforms an issue from an ordinary concern into a more critical one, thereby elevating its status above regular political discourse (Buzan et al., 1998a, p. 23). The theory posits that national security emerges from the politicization of issues by security actors to serve their own interests. Understanding the definition and criteria of securitization requires recognizing its foundation on intersubjective grounds (collective beliefs) about existential threats deemed significant enough to have substantial political effects (Buzan et al., 1998a, p. 25). This intersubjective basis has broadened the scope of security studies, moving beyond its previous military-centric focus on state-level concerns to include new sectors that allow security analysts to investigate securitization processes in more specific and directed frameworks.

The Copenhagen School of securitization classifies the securitization process into five sectors: Military, Political, Economic, Societal, and Environmental. Identifying the sector of a securitization process helps isolate relevant variables and interaction patterns related to the process. By breaking down complex variables, securitization can be better summarized and simplified for analytical purposes (Buzan et al., 1998a, p. 8). For instance, a securitization process in the societal sector would focus on issues of identity and cultural continuity.

Securitization involves rhetorical processes carried out by security actors, known as the Speech Act. The speech act refers to linguistic actions such as speeches or national media framing by security actors such as politicians or heads of state. Understanding the speech act is crucial in securitization, as it not only describes the reality of an issue but also shapes public perception of that issue.

To analyze a securitization process (speech act), three units must be identified: Referent Object: The entity perceived as threatened and possessing the legitimacy to survive. Security Actor: The actor initiating the securitization process,

constructing the narrative of the referent object facing an existential threat. Functional Actor: The actor influencing sectoral dynamics without being the referent object (Buzan et al., 1998a, pp. 35–36).

In certain sectors, such as the societal and political ones, Buzan and colleagues did not specify how functional actors are identified. To address this, Floyd (2021), in her work *Securitization and the Function of Functional Actors*, argues that the audience can be considered functional actors. While the Copenhagen School describes functional actors minimally, Floyd suggests that audiences can act as functional actors, influencing securitization processes without being security actors or threatening the referent object (Floyd, 2021, p. 10). For example, if a politician conducts a speech act directed at society, the audience can be categorized as functional actors because they have the capacity to affect the securitization process positively or negatively, especially in democratic contexts.

The success of securitization is not solely determined by security actors but also by supporting factors, which are divided into internal and external factors. Internal Factors includes the grammar of security employed by security actors in the speech act. Depending on the security sector being securitized, the grammar and tone of security will vary. In societal security for example, identity issues are frequently discussed; for environmental security, sustainability is the main topic; for political security, sovereignty is central, and so on.

External Factor are factors that are related to the position of the security actor conducting the speech act and the nature of the issue being framed as a threat. Security actors must possess authority (whether formal or informal) and frame an issue that can be collectively perceived as a threat by society. A speech act is more easily conducted when the framed issue is inherently threatening (e.g., military convoys, racial sentiments, or air pollution) and the securitizing actor is someone with power (Buzan et al., 1998b, pp. 32–33).

## **METHOD & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The type of research conducted is descriptive research with a qualitative approach. The primary characteristic of descriptive research is that the researcher does not have control over the variables being studied and can only report the findings factually (Kothari & Gaurav, 2019, pp. 2–3). Descriptive research is appropriate for this study, which aims to explain the securitization of identity issues during the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, with variables that cannot be controlled, such as the security actors and the phenomenon of identity issue securitization during the conflict.

This research focuses on the speech act process concerning identity issues by analyzing the security actor of Azerbaijan, specifically the President of Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, President Ilham Aliyev. The study seeks to understand and analyze the process of Azerbaijan's identity securitization and the chronology of identity securitization in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 2020, as carried out by the Azerbaijani government, particularly represented by President Ilham Aliyev in his speeches. The analysis was conducted using internet-based media, particularly the official website of the Azerbaijani presidency, [www.president.az](http://www.president.az), which provides President Ilham Aliyev's official speeches. The speeches analyzed were delivered between 2016 and 2020 and addressed issues regarding Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

To collect data on the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the researcher employed library research techniques, a method involving the collection of data from various literature sources relevant to the study (1999). Literature or library research is utilized by summarizing research findings on a specific topic. These summaries can come from research articles, conceptual articles, or theoretical contributions to the research topic.

To ensure the validity of the research data, the researcher applied the technique of data source triangulation. According to Patton (1999), triangulation in qualitative research refers to the use of various methods or data sources with the primary goal of developing a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. During the triangulation process, researchers use different methods, data, or theories from diverse sources to uncover new perspectives that support the initial findings of the study (Creswell, 2003, p. 251).

## DISCUSSION

### *Azerbaijan Identity*

Modern Azerbaijani identity is one that is shaped by the discourse of two ideological frameworks: Azerbaijanism and Turkism. Azerbaijanism is a nationalist ideology asserting that Azeris are an independent ethnic group residing in present-day Azerbaijan. Conversely, Turkism holds that Azeris are descendants of Turks and, therefore, ethnically Turkish. Despite initial conflicts and differing interpretations, these two identity discourses have significantly contributed to the development of the modern Azerbaijani identity, widely recognized by many Azerbaijani people as the "Azeri identity with Turkish origins" (Ergun, 2022, p. 819). This identity ideology has played a pivotal role in the nation-building process of modern Azerbaijan.

Throughout the Azerbaijani history, there have been two notable awakenings of Azerbaijani national identity. The first one is in 1905 that was triggered by the Tatar-Armenian War while the second one is in 1988, sparked by the early clashes of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Both events played critical roles in uniting the Muslim population of the South Caucasus into the Azeri nation that they are now before establishing the Azerbaijani state. The awakening in 1905 leaned towards the formation of an ethnic identity, while the 1988 awakening emphasized the establishment of a national identity and an independent Azerbaijani state.

The political discourse surrounding Azerbaijani identity advanced rapidly during the late Soviet era as tensions intensified between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Sumgait ethnic clashes in February 1988 catalyzed the rise of political organizations in Azerbaijan. By the end of 1988, Azerbaijan had around 40 civic and political organizations. Among these was the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), which later evolved into a nationalist political party of the same name (Demirtepe & Laciner, 2004).

The formation of modern Azerbaijani identity, which was largely driven by the Nagorno-Karabakh discourse and anti-Armenian sentiments, proves that for Azerbaijanis Nagorno-Karabakh is not merely an issue of territorial sovereignty for Azerbaijan but a critical element of its national identity. The territorial integrity of Nagorno-Karabakh is perceived as a vulnerability by segments of Azerbaijani society, and the loss of this region is seen as a threat to their identity, particularly from their "enemy," Armenia. Consequently, in this study, the referent object used by Azerbaijani security actors is the Azerbaijani national identity.

The first Nagorno-Karabakh War was started as inter-ethnic clashes between villages in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Azerbaijan military and Armenian-Karabakh militant. The conflict quickly escalated into a full-scale war when Armenia supplied weapons to Armenian-Karabakh militant groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting a military response from Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union under the notorious Operation Ring. Although militarily successful, Operation Ring became politically detrimental to Azerbaijan due to its controversial nature where it resulted in numerous Armenian civilian casualties. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and as the consequences of Operation Ring, the newly established Russian Parliament, who is seeking for political support, chose to side with Armenia in the new phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, shifting the dynamics of the war (De Waal, 2013, pp. 115–117).

## ***Analysis of Components of Azerbaijani Identity Securitization***

### **Referent Object**

The referent object in securitization refers to entities considered threatened and possessing legitimacy for survival (Buzan et al., 1998b, p. 36). It can include states, nations, or identities. In the context of societal-sector securitization, the referent object is anything perceived by a significant group in a specific region as essential, where its endangerment is interpreted as a threat to the group's existence (Buzan et al., 1998b, p. 123).

Azerbaijan has framed Armenia as the principal enemy, positioning the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as an existential threat to its national identity and, by extension, the state's very existence. However, anti-Armenian sentiment cannot be exclusively attributed to the Azerbaijani government as it also stems from historical trauma due to prolonged conflict and disputes during the formation of both ethnic groups. The Armenian-Azeri antagonism has spanned for almost a century, from the Armenian-Tatar conflict in 1905 to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in 1991. This historical backdrop has collectively fostered anti-Armenian sentiment among the Azerbaijani populace. The Azerbaijani government has acted as a facilitator of this sentiment by leveraging societal structures, such as mass media and schools, to reinforce the narrative (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2016; Kilit Aklar, 2005).

Securitization issues are inherently subjective; what one group perceives as an existential threat may not be viewed the same way by another. Therefore, framing an issue as a universally recognized threat necessitates a securitization process. This process involves speech acts, which connect the audience with the security actor, framing the issue as an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures to address.

The success of a securitization speech act is determined by two factors, which are internal factors and external factors. Both factors are closely tied to the security actor and the intrinsic nature of the security issue being securitized (Buzan et al., 1998b, pp. 30–31).

Internal Factors are factors that are tied to the security language used by the security actor. Depending on the security sector being addressed, the language and tone of security can vary. For societal security, issues of identity are frequently emphasized. For environmental security, sustainability becomes the primary focus, while political security often revolves around sovereignty, and so on. External Factors however are those related to the position of the security actor, who must

possess authority (whether formal or informal) and the inherent characteristics of the issue being framed as a threat. A speech act is more effectively executed when the issue being securitized is generally perceived as inherently threatening (e.g., military convoys, racism, or air pollution), and when the securitization is carried out by an individual or entity with significant power or influence (Buzan et al., 1998b, pp. 32–33).

### **Securitizing Actor**

During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan's speech acts were frequently performed by Azerbaijani political elites such as the President himself, Ilham Aliyev. The year 2016 to 2020 was a critical period for President Aliyev in framing Armenia as Azerbaijan's enemy, particularly as conflicts between the two nations peaked in 2016 and escalated into a full-scale war in 2020. Aliyev addressed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in various contexts, most of which were related to Azerbaijan's legitimate ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia's alleged agenda on the international stage to undermine Azerbaijan. In a speech delivered at the opening of the Fourth Congress of World Azerbaijanis, as reported on the official website of the Azerbaijani presidency, Ilham Aliyev stated:

*“It is clear that Armenian Diaspora organizations were formed over decades. They have penetrated into various leading media organizations of the world and are represented there. The Armenians are behind the overwhelming majority of materials tarnishing Azerbaijan, distorting the realities of Azerbaijan and slandering on us.”(President of Azerbaijan, 2016a)*

In this speech, President Aliyev framed the Armenian diaspora worldwide as an international enemy of Azerbaijan, alongside Armenia itself. Aliyev's remarks about how international media had been influenced by the Armenian diaspora indicated his intent to make the Azerbaijani public skeptical of international media outlets reporting negatively about Azerbaijan. This speech was particularly significant as it was delivered to the Azerbaijani public.

Throughout 2016, many of President Ilham Aliyev's speeches referenced two issues: Armenia's reluctance to cooperate diplomatically and the Armenian diaspora's efforts to tarnish Azerbaijan's international image. Aliyev described the April clashes as provocation by Armenia, which for over 20 years had rejected diplomatic solutions in favor of military options. He also expressed his disappointment with the Minsk Group mediators, whom he deemed ineffective. This disappointment was conveyed in a formal speech during the Nowruz national holiday celebration in

March 2016. According to the official website of the Azerbaijani presidency, President Aliyev stated:

*“The Azerbaijani people were not particularly optimistic of the activity of the Minsk Group anyway. However, their actions in January this year completely undermined any signs of confidence. As you know, two resolutions were tabled at the Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe. These resolutions were drawn up on the basis of in-depth analysis. A lot of work was done, and one resolution was adopted by a majority of votes.”(of Azerbaijan, 2016)*

In a meeting with Azerbaijan’s Security Council in April 2016, President Ilham Aliyev linked Armenia’s reluctance to cooperate as one of the reasons peace efforts could not succeed. This was evident in a speech accessible via the official Azerbaijani presidential website:

*“The main goal of Armenia is to keep the status quo unchanged. Unfortunately, the numerous statements by the heads of Minsk Group co-chair countries are having no effect on the Armenian authorities. These statements lie in the fact that the heads of the USA, Russia and France have repeatedly pointed out: the status quo is unacceptable, it should be changed and the issue should be resolved soon.”(Azerbaijan, 2016)*

In June and October 2016, President Aliyev delivered speeches addressing how the Armenian diaspora and Armenian lobby systematically sought to tarnish Azerbaijan’s image and position on the international stage. In a speech commemorating Azerbaijan’s 25th Independence Anniversary, President Ilham Aliyev stated: *“Armenia, using the capabilities of the Armenian lobby, conducted a smear campaign against us. We were deprived of the opportunity to respond and communicate reality to the world community. In other words, an end was put to international isolation and information siege.”* (President of Azerbaijan, 2016b).

By 2017, President Aliyev has delivered several speeches with anti-Armenian sentiment related to the April 2016 clashes. These speeches occurred on three separate occasions. The first was at the opening of a new military camp of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense in January 2017. As reported on the official Azerbaijani presidency website, Ilham Aliyev stated: *“The April battles are a major military victory for us. For many years, Armenia had been creating myths about its army and spring tales about its alleged invincibility. The April fighting showed whose army is actually invincible”*(President of Azerbaijan, 2017a).

The second occasion was during a meeting with the families of Azerbaijan's national heroes who had died in 2016, held on February 9. At this event, Ilham Aliyev remarked: *"After April, Armenia tried different ways to engage other countries in the problem. But all of their efforts were in vain and did not yield any fruit. The purpose of the latest provocation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border was precisely to engage the organization of which Armenia is a member in this affair"* (President of Azerbaijan, 2017b).

The third occasion was at a meeting with Azerbaijani soldiers commemorating the one-year anniversary of the April 2016 armed conflict. According to the official Azerbaijani presidency website, Ilham Aliyev described Armenia as an occupier: *"Defending our lands, the Azerbaijani army carried out a successful counteroffensive operation and dealt crushing blows to the enemy. As a result of the operation, thousands of hectares of Azerbaijani lands were liberated from the invaders."* (President of Azerbaijan, 2017c).

This framing persisted in President Ilham Aliyev's speeches, including in the two months leading up to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. In a speech at the inauguration of a new military unit of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense on June 25, 2020, President Aliyev stated: *"Therefore, I am saying that our youth should know this history, our ancient history. They should know that the present-day Armenia was established on Azerbaijani lands. They should know the real names of place names on the map of the present-day Armenia."* (President of Azerbaijan, 2017a). By framing Armenia as Azerbaijan's enemy, President Aliyev not only succeeded in amplifying anti-Armenian sentiment among the Azerbaijani public but also effectively portrayed Armenia as a tangible threat to Azerbaijan, symbolized by its annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh.


### **Functional Actor**

A functional actor is an actor that can significantly influence the dynamics of the securitization process without being either the referent object or the security actor in the process. Unlike other sectors of security, functional actors are not explicitly described by Buzan in the societal and political sectors. According to Floyd (2021), the audience can fulfill the role of a functional actor due to its ability to determine the success of a securitization process (Floyd, 2021). Therefore, in a democratic state like Azerbaijan, the role of the audience becomes highly significant in determining the success of the securitization of an issue, which leads to the conclusion that the Azerbaijani audience serves as the functional actor.

As an intersubjective process, the success of securitization heavily relies on the collective thinking of actors involved in the process. This means that threats,

vulnerabilities, and insecurities within a group do not arise naturally or objectively but are instead socially constructed based on objective facts and collectively accepted or believed (Buzan et al., 1998b, p. 57). This highlights the importance of consensus within a group in determining whether an issue is perceived as an existential threat.


In a survey conducted in 2013 regarding which countries are considered enemies of Azerbaijan, approximately 90% of Azerbaijani respondents identified Armenia as Azerbaijan’s main enemy, followed by Russia at 7%, and 2% who named other countries such as Iran, the United States, Turkey, and Israel. This is illustrated in the figure below:



**Figure 1.** Survey on Azerbaijan’s Main Enemies  
Source: [caucasusbarometer.org](http://caucasusbarometer.org)

From the figure above, it is apparent that the majority of the Azerbaijani public views Armenia as the main threat to Azerbaijan. This also demonstrates that the Azerbaijani government’s securitization of identity issues has been successful. This is further supported by the high level of public trust in Azerbaijan’s government. In a 2016 annual survey report conducted by the European Union, it was found that approximately 85% of Azerbaijanis trusted their government, 70% trusted political parties, and 66% trusted local governments (Union, 2016).

## Public Trust in Azerbaijani Government 2016-2020



**Figure 2.** EU Survey on Public Trust in the Azerbaijani Government, 2016–2020  
Source: EU Annual Report on Azerbaijan (Visualized by the Researcher)

The chart shows that public trust in the Azerbaijani government remains high, averaging around 80%. This trust remained stable, except in 2017 and 2020. In securitizing an issue, the social aspect is vital in connecting the security actor and its audience. A successful securitization requires shared values that are mutually appreciated by both the security actor and its audience (Buzan et al., 1998b, p. 40). The high level of trust in the government and deeply rooted anti-Armenian sentiment within society create ideal conditions for the securitization of Azerbaijan's identity issues in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

The success of this securitization can be observed in the public response in Azerbaijan, where massive demonstrations were held demanding the Azerbaijani government declare war on Armenia following armed clashes in July 2020 that resulted in the death of an Azerbaijani national hero, General Polad Hashimov. These demonstrations turned chaotic and unruly, with protesters chanting pro-war slogans and storming the Azerbaijani parliament building (Eurasianet, 2020).

## CONCLUSION

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 2020 stemmed from ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes over the contested region of "Nagorno-Karabakh." These two ethnic groups have clashed for over a century, from the Russian Empire's occupation era to modern times. Following the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1994, the intensity of clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan was reduced to sporadic armed skirmishes over the period from 1994 to 2020.

During this time, Azerbaijan experienced significant development in its national identity discourse, driven by its defeat in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. Anti-Armenian sentiment grew rapidly within Azerbaijani society after their loss in the 1994 war. This defeat occurred during the early years of the Republic of Azerbaijan's independence, a critical period for the formation of a new nation's identity. Consequently, this loss became a significant trauma for Azerbaijani society and intensified public animosity toward Armenia. As a result, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue became a crucial component of Azerbaijan's national identity, making it a perceived existential threat whenever the issue arose.

With deeply rooted anti-Armenian sentiment in society, the Azerbaijani government, as the securitizing actor, undertook a securitization process of the national identity issue, normalizing anti-Armenian sentiment through mass media and the education system. This is reflected in the third (2011), fourth (2016), and fifth (2023) reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which highlighted the role of Azerbaijani politicians in spreading anti-Armenian sentiment. This trend is also evident in speeches by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, published on the official presidential website, where he frequently framed the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and portrayed Armenia as a major threat to Azerbaijan.

In the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, the success of a securitization process heavily depends on the audience's response to the referent object raised by the securitizing actor. In the context of this research, Azerbaijan's referent object is the nation's identity, while the securitizing actor is the Azerbaijani government. The securitization process in Azerbaijan can be considered successful, as evidenced by the audience's—i.e., Azerbaijani society's—response, which also acts as the functional actor. Azerbaijani society exhibits a high level of anti-Armenian sentiment, directly connected to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This response is demonstrated by the public demonstrations in July 2020, which ultimately catalyzed the onset of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.

## REFERENCES

- Aslanli, A. (2022). The Politics of Ceasefire and the Occupation. In M. H. Yavuz & M. M. Gunter (Eds.), *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict* (1st ed., pp. 150–167). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003261209-10>
- Azerbaijan, P. of. (2016). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the meeting of the Security Council under the President of Azerbaijan » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic*. Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting of the Security Council under the President of Azerbaijan » Official Web-Site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/19323>
- BBC News. (2008, March 5). *Fatal Armenian-Azeri border clash*.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998a). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Buzan, Barry., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. de. (1998b). *Security : a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed method approaches* (2nd ed). Sage Publications.
- De Waal, T. (2013). *Black Garden* (10th year). New York University Press.
- Demirtepe, T., & Laciner, S. (2004). The Role of the Karabakh Issue in Restoration of Azerbaijani Nationalism. *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, 2(1), 187–210. <http://acikerisim.comu.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12428/518>
- Ergun, A. (2022). Citizenship, National Identity, and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan: Between the Legacy of the Past and the Spirit of Independence. *Nationalities Papers*, 50(4), 813–830. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.81>
- Erickson, E. J. (2022). How Do We Explain Victory? The Karabakh Campaign of 2020. In M. H. Yavuz & M. M. Gunter (Eds.), *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict* (1st ed., pp. 223–244). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003261209-14>
- Eurasianet. (2020, July 15). *Pro-war Azerbaijani protesters break into parliament*.

- European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. (2011). ECRI 3rd Report on Azerbaijan. In *Report on Azerbaijan*. <https://rm.coe.int/third-report-on-azerbaijan/16808b557e>
- European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. (2016). ECRI 4th Report on Azerbaijan. In *Report on Azerbaijan*. <https://rm.coe.int/fourth-report-on-azerbaijan/16808b5581>
- European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. (2023). *ECRI REPORT ON AZERBAIJAN (sixth monitoring cycle)*. <https://rm.coe.int/sixth-report-on-azerbaijan/1680ab9e35>
- Floyd, R. (2021). Securitisation and the function of functional actors. *Critical Studies on Security*, 9(2), 81–97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1827590>
- Group, I. C. (2021). Post-war Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh. In *Post-war Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/264-post-war-prospects-nagorno-karabakh>
- Hakan Yavuz, M., & Gunter, M. M. (2023). *The Karabakh Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan*. Springer International Publishing.
- Kilit Aklar, Y. (2005). Nation and History in Azerbaijani School Textbooks. *Ab Imperio*, 2005(2), 469–497. <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2005.0119>
- Kothari, C. R., & Gaurav, G. (2019). *Research methodology: methods and techniques* (Fourth). New Age International (P) Limited, Publishers.
- Kremlin. (2020, November 10). *Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation*.
- of Azerbaijan, P. (2016). Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the nationwide festivities on the occasion of Novruz holiday » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. In *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the nationwide festivities on the occasion of Novruz holiday » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic*. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/19436>

- Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. *Health Services Research*, 34(5 Pt 2), 1189–1208. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10591279>
- President of Azerbaijan. (2016a, June). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the opening of fourth Congress of World Azerbaijanis* » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/20192>
- President of Azerbaijan. (2016b, October). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the official reception to mark 25th anniversary of Azerbaijan's independence* » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/21414>
- President of Azerbaijan. (2017a, January). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the opening of new military camp of Defense Ministry's military unit* » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening of New Military Camp of Defense Ministry's Military Unit* » Official Web-Site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/22636>
- President of Azerbaijan. (2017b, February). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the meeting with family members of National Hero of Azerbaijan Chingiz Gurbanov* » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting with Family Members of National Hero of Azerbaijan Chingiz Gurbanov* » Official Web-Site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/22858>
- President of Azerbaijan. (2017c, March). *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the meeting with group of servicemen on anniversary of April victories of Azerbaijani army* » Official web-site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. *Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting with Group of Servicemen on Anniversary of April Victories of Azerbaijani Army* » Official Web-Site of President of Azerbaijan Republic. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/23254>
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (2010). *Azerbaijan Claims Five Killed In Clash On Nagorno-Karabakh Border*. In *Azerbaijan Claims Five Killed In Clash On Nagorno-Karabakh Border*. [https://www.rferl.org/a/Azerbaijan\\_Claims\\_Five\\_Killed\\_In\\_Clash\\_On\\_NagornoKarabakh\\_Border\\_/2145292.html](https://www.rferl.org/a/Azerbaijan_Claims_Five_Killed_In_Clash_On_NagornoKarabakh_Border_/2145292.html)
- Sanamyan, E. (2016, January 14). *Armenian-Azerbaijani Attrition War Escalates*.

- Smolnik, F., Alieva, L., Shirinian, T., O'Loughlin, J., Toal, G., & Bakke, K. M. (2021). *Local Dimensions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict*. 19-  
<https://doi.org/10.3929/ETHZ-B-000489488>
- Union, E. (2016). Annual Survey Report: Azerbaijan-1st Wave (Spring 2016). In *Annual Survey Report: Azerbaijan - 1st Wave (Spring 2016)*. European Union.  
[https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/full.report\\_azerbaijan.pdf](https://euneighbourseast.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/full.report_azerbaijan.pdf)
- Wolfenbarger, S. (2015). *Monitoring Border Conflicts with Satellite Imagery: Armenia and Azerbaijan 2008 - 2012*. American Association for the Advancement of Science. [https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/reports/Armenia%2520and%2520Azerbaijan.pdf?adobe\\_mc=MC MID%3D63377957515830342205187586389666388985%7CMCORGID%3D242B6472541199F70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1697183978](https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/reports/Armenia%2520and%2520Azerbaijan.pdf?adobe_mc=MC MID%3D63377957515830342205187586389666388985%7CMCORGID%3D242B6472541199F70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1697183978)